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2 Nation and region 
 
This chapter explores the contention that Germany and Vietnam were both 
divided states and divided nations before their respective (re)unification in 
1990 and 1976. International recognition of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV) and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) varied along the 
ideological lines of the Cold War, but the official date of state unification goes 
largely undisputed. The division of a nation is a far more difficult case to 
argue, however, let alone measure. Elsewhere I have studied political parties 
(Sutherland 2001, 2006a) and intellectuals (Sutherland 2006c) as agents of 
nationalist ideology. In this case, the focus on state fusion and nation-building 
calls for analysis of macro-level actors, namely the governments who 
negotiate these changes. Recent academic works entitled Vietnam: 
Borderless Histories (Tran & Reid 2006) and German History from the 
Margins (Gregor et al 2006) show that, contrary to what nation-building 
ideology might suggest, neither country‟s history can be viewed as the single, 
linear progression of a homogenous whole. Indeed, Vietnam and Germany 
did not exist as unified states until 1802 and 1871 respectively. Prior to these 
dates, the term „nation-state‟ was certainly a misnomer. Today, the presence 
of ethnic minorities in both states and the existence of an international 
diaspora indicate that an ethnic Vietnamese or German nation is not 
coterminous with state borders. Government definitions of the national 
community may be more or less exclusive, thereby affecting the status of 
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ethnic minorities living on state territory, citizenship and immigration regimes, 
and also the Vietnamese and German diasporas.  
 
Nation-building in the GDR and the FRG revolved around their 
competing claims to be the sole legitimate representative, or “rightful political 
embodiment” (McKay 1998, 3) of the German nation. Each state initially 
supported unification as a means of extending its political system across both 
territories, with the FRG eventually doing just that in 1990. In contrast to 
consistent West German support, the retreat of the GDR‟s ruling Socialist 
Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - SED) from the goal 
of German unity lasted from 1970 until the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 1976 
SED party programme tied its own legitimacy “to everything progressive in the 
history of the German people” (cited in McKay 1998, 120). This exemplifies 
the „direct line‟ or longue durée approach to nation-building, which seeks to 
derive current legitimation from a long historical lineage (Ludz 1977, 246). A 
similar strategy has been used consistently by the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP), which has blended communist ideology with nationalism 
throughout its history. For instance, Võ Nguyên Giáp, the general who 
masterminded victory over the French colonial power at the battle of Điện 
Biên Phủ in May 1954, was fond of repeating that revolutionary strategy had 
its direct antecedent in past wars against the Chinese (Turley 1980, 72). The 
SED‟s nationalist ideology changed quite radically with its pragmatic political 
interest in achieving international recognition for the GDR and placating the 
Soviet Union. This contributed to the limited impact of its propaganda on 
domestic legitimacy or citizens‟ evolving sense of German - and GDR - 
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identity. In West Germany, on the other hand, the principle of German unity 
embodied in its Basic Law was complemented by a strong commitment to 
European integration from its inception in the 1950s. Though Vietnam‟s 
membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is more 
recent, the VCP‟s regionalist ideology shared both Germanies‟ goal of 
buttressing the nation-state. 
 
I Vietnamese nation-building 
 
Today‟s Vietnamese state is a creature of conquest. Following a 
millennium of Chinese rule ending in the tenth century, the inhabitants of the 
Red River Delta began to extend their territorial reach from the eleventh 
century onwards, expanding progressively southwards into the lands of the 
once mighty Cham and Khmer civilisations. By 1471, the Cham empire had all 
but disappeared, its last vestiges wiped out by the nineteenth century Nguyễn 
emperors (Maspero 1928). By the mid-eighteenth century, Vietnamese soldier 
and peasant settlers had reached the Mekong delta, a process which pushed 
back Khmer control but left large numbers of ethnic Khmer in place. 
Effectively partitioned during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the 
Vietnamese empire would be unified in 1802 under Gia Long, founder of the 
Nguyễn dynasty. French conquest soon followed, however, and by 1887 
Vietnam had been divided into three administrative zones within French 
Indochina, partly designed to weaken any sense of national unity.  
 
 64 
Mountain ranges and climatic variations characterise a country 
stretching over two thousand kilometres, from the overpopulated rice plains of 
the Red River Delta in the north to the fertile and expansive Mekong Delta in 
the sub-tropical south. Politically, mountain passes marked Vietnam‟s 
seventeenth century division into rival regions and twentieth century schism 
into two republics. There are also uniting topographical features, however. 
The Trương Sơn mountain range, for instance, Vietnam‟s „backbone‟ running 
for two thirds of its length, was of strategic importance to successive imperial 
dynasties. It was also the site of the Ho Chi Minh trail, which played a key part 
in the DRV‟s official war effort to “liberate the South and to unify the country” 
(Khoi 2001, 66). Contrasting living conditions, historical settlement and ethnic 
mixes across the country go some way towards explaining commonly held 
stereotypes amongst Vietnamese themselves (Li 1998, 156). It is important to 
note that the division of Vietnam‟s current territory during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century also did much to foster “two different ways of being 
Vietnamese” (Li 1998, 12). For instance, northerners can be portrayed as 
more reserved and frugal than southerners, who are reputed to be rather 
spendthrift and fun-loving. Under the nominal rule of the Lê dynasty 
throughout, the northern and southern territories, or inner region (Đang Tròng) 
and outer region (Đang Ngoài), were actually controlled by the rival Trịnh and 
Nguyễn lords respectively. Southern administration was characterised by the 
promotion of Buddhism, international trade and a distinct taxation system, the 
burden of which was none too heavy on its relatively expansive and fertile 
lands. Northern rule, on the other hand, remained firmly wedded to Confucian 
principles and a more isolationist agricultural economy across the limited 
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lands of the Red River Delta, going some way towards explaining the origins 
of the above stereotypes. The notional unity of Vietnamese history evidently 
does not go uncontested. 
 
The legacy of Nguyễn Hoàng, the sixteenth century general originally 
sent southwards from Hanoi to pacify „pirates‟ and Mạc rebels, but who 
definitively returned south in 1600 to establish his own rule there, has been 
largely ignored in today‟s official Vietnamese historiography as undermining 
the nation-building myth of unity (Taylor 1993, 45). For Vietnamese historians 
“who were obliged to construct a national history that emanated from and 
evolved around Hanoi, such interpretations, with their claims and suggestions 
of southern autonomy, had to be carefully managed” (Pelley 2002, 31) 
following independence from colonialism in 1946. Western historians also 
continue to debate the significance of Nguyễn Hoàng‟s actions, some 
suggesting that loyalty to lineage and land of origin overrode any ambitions for 
autonomy during much of the seventeenth century (Cooke 1998). Yet the year 
1627, when Nguyễn Hoàng‟s son stopped paying taxes to Hanoi (then Thăng 
Long) can be interpreted as a key event in establishing a separate polity and 
formalising the de facto disunity of which contemporary sources were well 
aware (Taylor 1993, 58). The resulting wars shaped southern life for much of 
the seventeenth century. By the turn of the eighteenth century, however, the 
Nguyễn lords were trying to establish themselves as monarchs, renaming 
themselves accordingly, applying (unsuccessfully) for separate recognition by 
their suzerains in Beijing, and even creating their own originary myth (Li 1993, 
46, 101). Continual southward expansion was also encouraged under the 
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Nguyễn lords, and not their northern counterparts. Even the Nguyễn were not 
fully in control of the southern reaches of their rapidly expanding empire, 
however, which would eventually provide the basis of the Tây Sơn rebellion 
and their own downfall; “The final collapse of the Nguyễn regime in Đang 
Tròng, therefore, seems to have had everything to do with its expansion in the 
southern and western directions. In merely two hundred years, this regime 
had acquired three-fifths of Vietnam‟s contemporary territory” (Li 1993, 153). 
Yet only a century later, Vietnam would once again be divided, this time into 
the three French colonial pays of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina.  
 
When Nguyễn Ánh finally brought northern and southern territories 
together in 1802 under the name Gia Long, court historians were keen to 
cement his legitimacy by stressing an orderly transition from the previous Lê 
dynasty, conveniently „forgetting‟ that “the Nguyễn regime destroyed national 
unity for two hundred years” (Li 1998, 13). Later, the VCP would be equally 
keen to stress its key nation-building myths of national unity and resistance to 
foreign aggression, inscribing the existence of Đang Tròng within an orderly 
process of southward expansion (nam tiến), if at all. However, the suggestion 
that this was a smooth, centrally organised “linear progression” (Li 1998, 19) 
is misleading. Before the decisive defeat of the Cham empire by Lê Thánh 
Tôn in 1471, conflicts were rather about prestige, people and treasure than a 
coherent policy of extending Vietnamese Lebensraum beyond the cramped 
Red River Delta. Thereafter, devastating wars between the Lê and the Mạc, 
compounded by failed crops and famine, caused many to flee southwards for 
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survival, and most officially sanctioned migration was in order to establish 
military outposts (Li 1998, 25). National unity was never a given.  
 
If southern Vietnamese identity had anything distinctive, it was as a 
hybrid of local and immigrant cultures, which in some ways had more in 
common with other Southeast Asian civilisations than with China. It did not 
experience imposed Vietnamisation (Li 1993, 99, 156). Accordingly, some of 
the Sino-Vietnamese structures, rites and beliefs so central to life in the Red 
River Delta lost their significance in southern society. The village unit as an 
established source of family identity and community, for example, was 
undermined by the characteristic mobility of the southern settlers (Li 1993, 
110). Today, patterns of religious worship also differ substantially across 
Vietnam. Whereas the cult of the Holy Mothers thrives in northern Vietnam, 
for instance (Ngo 2003), syncretic religions such as Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài are 
peculiar to the south (P. Taylor 2001, 17). At the same time, it would be 
dangerous simply to substitute a history of unity with one of division into two 
or even three parts. The aim here is merely to highlight that there are "many 
voices that undermine the idea of a single Vietnamese past" (Taylor 1995, 5). 
Nevertheless, an important strand of VCP nation-building is a consciously 
constructed narrative geared to legitimising and maintaining a unified 
Vietnamese nation-state within today‟s borders. Unsurprisingly, this eminently 
politicised view has poured scorn on Vietnamese historians of southern origin 
who emphasised regional identities or Nguyễn Hoàng‟s role in establishing 
what they saw as “the autonomy of culture and politics in the South” (Pelley 
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2002, 39), for instance. Yet the attitude of VCP ideologues towards southern 
particularities has not been consistent, either.  
 
Immediately following unification in 1976, southern reluctance to 
implement collectivisation and nationalisation was vilified as „backward‟ 
compared to the more „advanced‟ communist system in the north (P. Taylor 
2001, 26). Following đổi mới, however, this „resistance‟ gained more positive 
connotations in some quarters, as southern experience of commerce and 
trade became worthy of attention and eventually emulation (P. Taylor 2001, 
85, 90). Most official VCP spokesmen would note regional differences only to 
emphasise the overriding national patriotism of southern inhabitants, as 
exemplified by their home-grown communist heroes (P. Taylor 2001, 91). 
They asserted that despite the corrupting influence of the French and 
Americans, southern Vietnamese retained their ancestors‟ pioneering spirit 
and love of country. In the early 1980s, however, some official sources 
recognised southern particularities, suggesting that factors such as greater 
pragmatism, dynamism and „modernity‟ made the region well placed to face 
the challenges of globalisation. This was sometimes couched in an alternative 
narrative of ancient origins, one which downplayed French colonial and 
„neocolonial‟ U.S. influence in creating a narrative of southern diversity and 
openness to change. It highlighted indigenous traits, such as a pioneering 
spirit and a pre-colonial agricultural commodity economy, pointing to different 
settlement patterns from the archetypal, enclosed northern Vietnamese village 
as evidence of a more syncretic and fluid way of life. These traits are 
sometimes used to link the ancient Sa Huỳnh and Óc Eo civilisations of 
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southern Vietnam to regional characteristics, thereby apparently 
acknowledging their indigenous descendants alongside Vietnamese settlers. 
In constructing a sea-oriented, trading tradition and emphasising peaceful 
integration with local Khmer and Cham, three centuries of Vietnamese history 
were thus extended to three or four thousand years. This was quite difficult to 
reconcile with the dominant narrative of a southwards march into deserted 
territory (P. Taylor 2001, 109). Despite such tendentious essentialisations of 
the Vietnamese south as embodying change and the north as representing 
tradition, the contested concept of regional identity tended to be resolved in 
favour of wider nation-building themes, such as foreign threats and 
“grassroots heroism” (P. Taylor 2001, 177). 
 
The Nguyễn dynasty‟s ignominious defeat by French colonialists in the 
mid-nineteenth century led to its loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Vietnamese people and a need for new leaders to take on „the mandate of 
heaven‟ (Mus 1973; Vu 2007, 186). French colonialism brought with it a spate 
of soul-searching amongst the Vietnamese, which would continue unabated 
until at least 1945. The ultimate success of France‟s gradual incursions into 
Vietnam was commonly attributed to the inadequacy of the Vietnamese 
imperial court, its stubborn ignorance of scientific advances and its over-
reliance on an ossified form of Confucian teaching. The defeat of the anti-
colonialist „Aid the King‟ (Cần Vương) movement in 1895 was often 
interpreted amongst Vietnam‟s young, educated elite as conclusive proof of 
the anachronistic nature of Confucianism, hitherto the main source of court 
morality and government. Reduced to puppets of the French, subsequent 
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emperors lost any remaining credibility. In time, the scholar-intellectuals once 
deemed worthy of the highest respect became as outdated as the court they 
served, to be replaced by a younger generation with a new-fangled education 
and no socially entrenched right to be heard. Nonetheless, they raided the 
past for the symbolic right to influence Vietnam‟s future. Their one common 
theme was anti-colonialism and the pressing need to regain Vietnamese 
autonomy, if not full independence. A measure of the importance of this goal 
and its link to individual self-respect is evident from the „Society of Like 
Hearts‟, active in the 1920s, which had no clear manifesto beyond 
independence and the restoration of Vietnamese “dignity as human beings” 
(Tai 1992, 64). Similarly, the ongoing Vietnamese self-strengthening 
movement – giving rise to organisations like the Self-Cultivation League, the 
Self-Perfection Society and the Self-Reliance Literary Group – points to the 
overlap between intellectuals‟ aspirations for themselves and their community.  
 
Until the early twentieth century, Vietnamese men of learning could be 
more or less equated with the imperial bureaucracy. Classical Confucian 
scholars aspired to pass the civil examinations and become court mandarins, 
contenting themselves with local officialdom or a life of teaching and 
contemplation if they failed. When this system was discontinued in 1929, 
Vietnamese could, at best, hope for a minor post in the colonial 
administration. Vietnamese nationalist thinkers belonged primarily to the 
educated bourgeoisie (Tai 1992, 55). Some made their living as writers, 
journalists and teachers, or even professional revolutionaries as in the case of 
Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940). The non-professional intellectual stratum was 
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restricted to the few Confucian scholars who opted for passive resistance to 
colonialism and withdrew to their villages. Whereas those active from the turn 
of the twentieth century until the 1920s were schooled in the Confucian 
tradition, the next generation was more often a product of western education. 
Most were still deeply imbued with Confucian ethics, however, even if no 
longer capable of reading classical Chinese texts.  
 
Vietnamese intellectuals had no wish to do away with all that was not 
modern. For instance, the first generation nationalists Phan Bội Châu and 
Phan Chu Trinh (1872 – 1926) saw the nation as a stamping ground for heroic 
men of virtue modelled on the Confucian canon, rather than a means of 
mobilising the people. Tellingly, Phan Chu Trinh‟s account of the American 
revolution for an Asian audience put George Washington at the forefront of a 
moral struggle, with little mention of other factors (Woodside 1976, 40). Such 
an elitist understanding of government was difficult to reconcile with the 
advent of mass politics, and the neo-traditionalist tendency was largely 
abandoned by the next generation of Vietnamese nationalist intellectuals. Ho 
Chi Minh‟s communist-led Viet Minh coalition was only one of many 
contesting the nature of the Vietnamese nation (Tai 1992). Nguyễn An Ninh, 
for example, died in 1943 as one of many anti-colonialists to perish in the 
infamous French island prison of Poulo Condore. Greatly influenced by 
anarchism and Nietzsche, he promoted individual liberty and espoused the 
vision propounded by the French socialist Jean Jaurès of “nationalism which 
extends into internationalism” (Tai 1992, 83). In the event, the Viet Minh’s 
combination of nationalism with the ostensible goal of worldwide proletarian 
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revolution helped to give them the upper hand over the likes of Nguyễn An 
Ninh and faction-ridden nationalist groups such as the Việt Nam Quốc Dân 
Đảng (Evans & Rowley 1990, 11).   
 
The younger generation of Vietnamese nationalists often graduated 
from French schools, which were open only to a select and carefully 
controlled group destined for lowly administrative positions far below their 
capabilities. With only about a dozen graduating from university a year, the 
“French colonial presence in Vietnam insidiously undermined feelings of self-
esteem, self-worth, and self-satisfaction […] even those who did not suffer in 
objective terms developed a strong sense of relative deprivation” (Jamieson 
1993, 97). Mired in petty officialdom, it is likely that they projected their own 
lack of advancement on the situation of their country and compatriots as a 
whole. How could Vietnamese fulfil their potential when colonial policy 
explicitly stated that no native, however highly qualified, should earn more 
than a French caretaker employed in Vietnam (Jamieson 1993, 97)? 
Paradoxically, it was exposure to French philosophers such as Rousseau and 
Montesquieu, mostly via Chinese translations, which helped sow the seeds of 
nationalist responses to colonialism (Bradley 2000, 12). Intellectuals 
attempted to recover a sense of pride through a new interpretation of 
Vietnamese culture. They spent a substantial proportion of their time 
expounding theories of resistance and renewal, using the cause of national 
independence as their vehicle. David Marr (1981) charts the exponential rise 
in book publishing and chronicles its largely nationalist themes from the later 
1920s on. Significantly, biographies of national heroes made up the large 
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majority of publications (Whitmore 1983, 10). An estimated ninety percent of 
Ho Chi Minh‟s Youth League in 1928 came from this young intelligentsia, 
some of whom were being groomed to form the future communist party (Marr 
1981, 374). These recruits put their modern science and ideology to the 
service of a historicising nationalism led by the charismatic „Uncle Ho‟. Their 
interpretation of the Vietnamese nation would shape official nation-building 
following independence. 
 
The Viet Minh - headed by the last of the „old school‟ Confucian 
scholars, Ho Chi Minh - is widely recognised to have best captured the 
imagination and loyalty of the people because of its active organisation of 
resistance and proselytisation amongst the peasantry. Its overriding goal was 
abundantly clear from its name, a shortened form of „League for Vietnamese 
Independence‟. Although officially a cross-party alliance of nationalist groups 
created in 1941, communists dominated the Viet Minh and the coalition 
government which took office after the revolution of August 1945. As early as 
1931, Ho Chi Minh himself was criticised by Vietnamese communist cadres 
faithful to the Soviet Comintern for emphasising the national character of the 
independence struggle over its socialist goals (Turley 1980, 51). His priorities 
were not to change, however. Ten years later, he penned an overtly patriotic 
letter to the Vietnamese people, likening the national struggle ahead to 
Vietnam‟s resistance to Chinese and Mongol invasions throughout its history. 
In the same way as the generals who saw off these mighty foes, Ho Chi Minh 
himself would soon come to be revered according to the long-standing 
Vietnamese practice of hero worship. This cult of personality also fitted into 
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the almost universal Vietnamese practice of honouring dead ancestors, with 
Ho Chi Minh characterised as the „father of the nation‟ (Tai 1995). 
Significantly, Ho Chi Minh‟s patriotic letter also referred to the Bronze Age 
kingdom of Âu Lạc, deemed an early example of Vietnamese civilisation in the 
Red River Delta. This was an appeal to Vietnamese patriotism without a 
single reference to communist principles; “Ho Chi Minh set the tone of Viet 
Minh propaganda by giving Vietnamese resistance to foreign aggression a 
timeless quality above and beyond the historical dialectic” (Marr 1981, 402). 
 
In 1927, Ho Chi Minh published a book entitled „The Road to 
Revolution‟, containing much-simplified Leninist thought in a form specially 
tailored to his Vietnamese recruits. He made references to French oppression 
as well as to moral principles familiar to every child brought up in the 
Confucian way (Marr 1981, 375). Military generals from the first millennium 
C.E., who had fought for an imperial dynasty against the Chinese and the 
Mongols, were anachronistically redefined as Vietnamese national liberation 
heroes. Traditional symbolism was thereby used to incorporate Lenin into the 
Vietnamese pantheon of heroes. Even Trotsky could be worshipped amongst 
his Vietnamese followers in accordance with this tradition (Tai 1992, 242). 
The adulatory funeral of the first generation nationalist Phan Chu Trinh also 
unleashed a wave of nationalist fervour. Regardless of ideology, these figures 
were all integrated into what was by then perceived as an ongoing national 
struggle for independence. In turn, „Uncle Ho‟s‟ carefully crafted image of 
accessibility, asceticism and true moral fibre enabled him to appear at once 
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as the modern „father of the nation‟, a virtuous Confucian elder and a 
communist revolutionary.  
 
Often pictured surrounded by children, dressed in peasant garb and 
smoking (his only public vice), Ho Chi Minh presented an image with which all 
social and educational strata could identify; he seemed the embodiment of 
revolutionary spirit and traditional wisdom. In a direct reference to Vietnam, 
the scholar of nationalism A.D. Smith (1981, 132) suggests that the “curious 
symbiosis of Marxist communism and nationalism” there was made possible 
through an alliance with the peasantry. Though Marxism was popular 
amongst Vietnamese intellectuals, with its promise of modernisation without 
imperialism, it had to percolate through a nationalist filter to be made 
palatable to the peasant masses. In contrast to industrial-age workers or 
upstart entrepreneurs, a tiny minority of Vietnam‟s rural economy in any case, 
the peasantry had the required stamp of authenticity, an ancient ethnic 
cachet.  By the late 1930s, the communists were becoming decidedly more 
nationalist than universalist, in order to dissociate themselves from the then 
French socialist government‟s disappointing response to their demands. Ho 
Chi Minh understood that “selective glorification of the Vietnamese past [and] 
praise of particular Vietnamese customs” (Marr 1981, 416) could mobilise his 
compatriots more effectively than explanations of historical materialism.  
 
The year 1935 saw the Vietnamese communists seeking to ally with 
Vietnamese „bourgeois nationalists‟, in line with the Soviet Comintern policy of 
creating a popular front in order to achieve a two-stage revolution. These 
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compatriots shared a form of linguistic nationalism, which championed a 
romanised transcription of Vietnamese as the national script. Known as quốc 
ngữ – meaning national language – it offered an alternative to both the 
Chinese ideograms used at the imperial court and a Vietnamese variant of 
these called nôm. The easy-to-learn Latin alphabet was promoted to 
encourage literacy amongst Vietnamese speakers and a sense of shared 
identity, which had not been facilitated by complex ideograms accessible only 
to the well-educated. The French had originally thought that their own support 
for quốc ngữ would undermine the status of the traditional elite and bind the 
population to the colonial regime. On the contrary, literature and newspapers 
in quốc ngữ not only helped to awaken the political consciousness of the 
people, but also encouraged Vietnamese intellectuals to express themselves 
in their own idiom instead of French or Chinese. A bridge to the Vietnamese 
village was built; intellectuals found they could speak the language of the 
masses literally through quốc ngữ and figuratively through an ideology which 
portrayed traditional values and customs as the wellspring of the Vietnamese 
nation. Accordingly, the „Theses on Vietnamese Culture‟ promulgated by the 
communist party in 1943 sought to present culture as a vital element of the 
revolutionary struggle against colonialism. Vietnamese culture was envisaged 
as “pure and beautiful”, free of superstition and corruption (Trường Chinh 
cited in Endres 2002, 305). Rural festivals, for instance, fell out of favour. In 
1957 Nhân Dân, the communist party mouthpiece, called them “depraved 
customs” (cited in Endres 2002, 303) reminiscent of feudalism. Today, 
however, their official rehabilitation seems complete (Nguyễn et al 2003). 
Philip Taylor (2002) has documented a contemporary folk revival with a 
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nationalist gloss, officially condoning Vietnamese forms of worship in 
response to the last twenty years of market liberalisation and opening to the 
West. The VCP‟s nationalist discourse has thus adapted to changing times, 
but the core principle of prioritising the independence of a unified Vietnamese 
nation has never wavered. 
 
William Duiker (1981, 5) reports Ho Chi Minh‟s comment that “for him, 
the road to communism went through nationalism”, illustrating how closely the 
two ideologies were linked in the Vietnamese case. Today, „Uncle Ho‟s‟ 
carefully constructed cult of personality as a Vietnamese father figure 
continues to emphasise his nationalism as much as his communist 
credentials. One of his most quoted phrases, emblazoned on a banner at the 
entrance to his mausoleum, reads „there is nothing more precious than 
independence and freedom.‟ Ironically, the VCP‟s attempts at defining the 
national essence are not so far removed from the works of French 
collaborators such as Phạm Quỳnh (Tai 1992, 50), although the emphasis on 
Vietnam‟s Bronze Age origins was not current in colonial times (Pelley 1995, 
234-235). Born in the 1890s and an early victim of Viet Minh reprisals, Phạm 
Quỳnh edited a newspaper intended as a mouthpiece for official French 
views. He believed in the inherent superiority of French culture, but 
nonetheless considered himself patriotic in supporting the continued presence 
of the French in Vietnam as a guiding hand to lift the country out of what he 
considered its backward state (Tai 1992, 52). Although an ardent supporter of 
quốc ngữ, his search for the national essence was not a reaffirmation of the 
value of village life, but rather a litany of proposals for its reform. Rather 
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paradoxically, however, even he believed the spirit of resistance to be central 
to the Vietnamese national soul (Pelley 1995, 235).  The portrayal of Vietnam 
as a nation is thus eminently ideological, and historical interpretation plays an 
important part in this.  
 
To quote a Vietnamese text dated 1906; “If there is a nation, then it 
must have a history” (cited in Kelley 2003, 73). Vietnamese intellectuals 
redefined symbols and traditions according to the new nationalist idiom which, 
in turn, was to be propagated through modern education. Traditional scholars 
were chastised for ignoring “the famous people and great events of our 
fatherland” (cited in Kelley 2003, 74). Chinese administrators once deemed 
worthy of emulation were written out of history and figures hitherto respected 
for their virtue were admired for their nationalism instead. This nation-building 
trend can be traced through the waves of anti-colonial resistance, the 
revolutionary rhetoric of the Viet Minh and the nation-building ideology of the 
VCP‟s various incarnations. In August 1945, the Viet Minh helped to channel 
the patriotic fervour of a people galvanised by severe famine, coupled with the 
end of World War II and the total collapse of Japanese and French legitimacy 
(Marr 1981, 371). The Viet Minh‟s rhetoric, rooted as it was in traditional 
Vietnamese values and cultural forms, was an important source of popularity. 
This interpretation of history continued to be faithfully upheld in communist 
party propaganda during the Vietnam-American war, which urged soldiers to 
go to the front safe in the knowledge that they had four thousand years of 
history behind them. After the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the VCP‟s then 
general secretary echoed Ho Chi Minh‟s rhetoric by evoking the Trưng sisters 
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and the Lady Triệu, leaders of 1st and 3rd century anti-Chinese insurrections 
respectively (Post 1989, 83). 
 
Viet Minh rhetoric was a combination of appeals to traditional virtues, 
references to past heroes and pleas for Vietnamese solidarity in the face of 
foreign aggression. As a vision of mythically inspired nationalist unity 
transcending political divisions and internal contradictions, it was in direct 
contrast to French colonial accounts of Vietnam as an ethnically divided 
society (Pelley 1998, 376). Yet the Viet Minh‟s emphasis on historic victories 
ascribed to the Vietnamese (or Kinh) majority was problematic in that it was 
unlikely to resonate with Vietnam‟s many ethnic minorities. Although Ho Chi 
Minh may have used Kinh-based appeals to the majority, he was nonetheless 
eminently pragmatic in making it as palatable as possible to the minority, 
however. Indeed, in 1937, before the inevitable split between Vietnamese 
communists and Trotskyists, the latter already felt that too much attention was 
being paid to ethnic issues, to the detriment of class struggle (Marr 1981, 
390). Significantly, Ho sought to valorise minority cultures by recognising their 
languages and devoting some of his prodigious poetic output to their 
traditions, as well as integrating them into the party machinery (Marr 1981, 
404). One important reason for including ethnic minorities in the Viet Minh 
was that it had its strongest base in northern Vietnam before the August 
revolution. This mountainous area, with concentrations of Thai, Hmong, Dao 
and other ethnicities, had a history of being more antagonistic towards the 
lowland Vietnamese than towards the French (Pelley 1998, 382). Similarly, 
contact with minorities from Vietnam‟s central highlands had hitherto been 
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limited to trade and a recognition of Kinh suzerainty, punctuated by regular 
warfare and banditry (Proschan 2003, 60). The aim of the Viet Minh amongst 
these overwhelmingly rural farming communities was to train locals to become 
cadres and have the ethnic Kinh withdraw from the villages, so that the 
revolution would be perceived there as truly nationwide and not dominated by 
the majority ethnic group. 
  
Ho Chi Minh‟s approach to integrating ethnic minorities conveniently 
chimed with one interpretation of Vietnam‟s foundation myth. This tells of the 
hundred sons of a dragon king and a fairy queen, half of whom stayed in the 
flatlands and became ancestors of the Kinh, half of whom went to the 
mountains to become the forefathers of minority groups. This legend may 
have been manipulated for modern requirements, however. Indeed, the 
mountains referred to could be those of Ba Vì, lying only sixty kilometres from 
Hanoi and remembered as the stamping ground of the legendary Hùng kings, 
rather than the distant highland homelands of most ethnic minorities.  
 
The Vietnamese nation is officially deemed to be composed of fifty-four 
ethnic groups, including the ethnic Vietnamese (Kinh), who make up around 
86% of the population. Characterisations of the majority Kinh as the „older 
brother‟ of other ethnic minorities testifies to a sense of kinship, albeit with a 
clear indication of which is the “dominant ethnie” (A.D. Smith 1995, 106) 
within the “Vietnamese national family” (An Thu cited in Pelley 1998, 384). 
Rather more neutrally, the 1992 constitution defines Vietnam as “a unified 
state of the ethnicities (các dân tộc) who live on Vietnamese territory” (cited in 
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Proschan 2003, 57). Nevertheless, the perception that the ethnic Kinh are 
more advanced culturally and economically, with a concomitant duty to help 
those „less developed‟, has been a constant theme of post-colonial discourse. 
In 1960, for instance, then communist party secretary Lê Duẩn announced a 
migration programme designed to help “the ethnic minorities catch up with the 
Kinh” (Lê Duẩn, cited in Hardy 2003, 110). Current cultural policy pursues the 
official goal of unity in diversity (Dang 1998, 45), but persistent inequalities 
and a long-standing policy of migration from the overcrowded lowlands to 
„new economic zones‟ in the highlands has fuelled ethnic tensions.  
 
Today‟s official nation-building emphasises continuity and a lasting 
sense of Vietnamese nationhood throughout the ages, regardless of its 
anachronistic and exclusionary aspects. Post-colonial histories sponsored by 
the VCP hammered home its ideological vision of a united nation, despite 
centuries of autonomous rule and development in the country‟s south (Pelley 
1995, 244; Li 1998). They underplayed the gradual southwards expansion of 
the Vietnamese empire from the Red River Delta, so as not to disrupt the 
dominant narrative thread of Vietnam as a victim and not a perpetrator of 
expansionism. Although this southwards movement saw the progressive 
subjugation of Cham and Khmer territories over a period of some five 
centuries, only reaching today‟s Ho Chi Minh City in 1674, official histories 
characterised Vietnam as a single, fixed bloc, with a common language, 
territory, economy and culture (Pelley 1995, 240). On the other hand, a great 
deal of ethnographic research was carried out after 1954, which seemed to 
support the idea of ethnic diversity. Official Vietnamese historiography was 
 82 
thus decidedly schizophrenic, until a renewed focus on traditions of resistance 
to foreign aggression and latterly a fascination with an even more distant, 
Bronze Age past helped it transcend troublesome ethnic divisions and 
inconsistencies with a uniting narrative. 
 
The 1955 Geneva accords marking the end of the first Indochinese 
War between France and Vietnam temporarily divided the territory along the 
seventeenth parallel, stipulating that elections should be held within two years 
across the whole country. A Vietnamese present at the negotiations remarked 
ominously; “The competition begins between the South and the North” (Tran 
Van Do, cited in Catton 2002, 26). Indeed, Ngô Đình Diệm, who in 1955 took 
over as leader of the newly proclaimed southern Republic of Vietnam (RVN) 
from the discredited Nguyễn emperor Bảo Đại, was constantly competing 
economically and ideologically with the DRV to be recognised as the 
legitimate leader of an „unnaturally‟ divided Vietnam. Diệm‟s delegation had 
not signed the Geneva accords, something which was later presented in RVN 
propaganda as a patriotic protest against the “amputation of the national 
territory” (cited in Masur 2004, 158). Literature circulating in the RVN echoed 
this sentiment, suggesting that the notion of a single Vietnamese „geo-body‟ 
was accepted beyond official circles; “Fold up all the maps. Everything that 
bears any trace of the concept of division, I want to cast it all away” (Thao 
Truong, cited in Jamieson 1993, 285). Yet the same idea of national unity was 
being propagated in the DRV. Jamieson (1993, 273) also cites a propaganda 
poem by Truong Lu; “O southern region of a thousand memories and a million 
affections/ Flesh of our flesh, blood of our blood/ The flesh cannot be torn 
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asunder/ And your blood is still mingled with ours”. In the RVN, its position 
was officially contrasted to the DRV‟s alleged abdication of sovereignty to 
Chinese and Soviet communism, its disavowal of national heroes and its 
neglect of the Vietnamese arts. In Diệm‟s own words, “nationalism which 
allies itself with communism is bound to end up in treason” (cited in Catton 
2002, 37). Diệm‟s regime officially portrayed itself as battling “Communism, 
Underdevelopment, and Disunity” (cited in Catton 2002, 37). Disunity, 
understood as both ideological and territorial, was attributed to colonial 
partition and underdevelopment. Anti-communism, in turn, was supplemented 
by the rather vague and opaque doctrine of personalism, which Diệm sought 
to reconcile with Asian traditions such as Confucianism. At the same time, 
however, the VCP was preparing to “liberate the South and to unify the 
country” (Khoi 2001, 66).  
 
Ngô Đình Diệm‟s regime pursued the most developed nation-building 
programme during the short life of the RVN. Diệm set about establishing his 
legitimacy as president of a “Diệmocracy”, which placed more emphasis on 
the role of an enlightened sovereign than free elections, parliamentary debate 
or the like (Masur 2004, 33). By denouncing the DRV as incompatible with 
Vietnamese tradition and under the thumb of a foreign ideology, Diệm was 
staking the RVN‟s own claim to be the only legitimate successor to Vietnam‟s 
history of resistance and cultural sophistication (Catton 2002, 27). For 
instance, Diệm declared a national holiday to remember the Hùng kings, thus 
seeking to burnish his own, young regime with the patina of an ancient, Red 
River civilisation. He sought to overcome the lack of territorial continuity 
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between the Red River Delta and the RVN by building up the central 
Vietnamese city of Huế as a centre of traditional learning and culture to rival 
Hanoi. Situated close to the demarcation line between the DRV and the RVN, 
Huế‟s newly-founded university and restored national monuments were meant 
to function as a beacon of „true‟ Vietnamese culture and values that would 
radiate north. In accordance with this aim, the Nguyễn dynasty‟s role in 
facilitating colonial encroachment and their citadel‟s similarity to Beijing‟s 
forbidden city were omitted from official publications, which carefully 
distinguished Vietnamese culture from Chinese forms and antecedents 
(Masur 2004, 144).   
 
Diệm was well aware of the ambivalence of his own reliance on U.S. 
support and the difficulty of reconciling this with his self-conscious patriotism 
(Catton 2002, 25), but also realised the need for economic development to 
foster legitimacy. Convinced of the importance of winning „hearts and minds‟, 
he pursued various nation-building policies through propaganda campaigns, 
film and radio broadcasting, education drives and a range of printed media, 
before being ousted in 1963. Key themes included the vilification of the 
communist „Other‟ and the idea of self-sacrifice, which he claimed to embody 
in an attempted cult of personality that could do little to compete with „Uncle 
Ho‟ (Catton 2002, 35). Nevertheless, Diệm purported to represent the true 
Vietnamese nation, declaring in 1956 that his aim was to “unify our ravaged 
fatherland” (cited in Masur 2004, 45) despite his refusal to contest elections.  
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Diệm also had recourse to familiar themes of historical heroism to 
bolster his rule. For instance, the introduction of another national holiday 
honouring the Trưng sisters emphasised their non-imperial, mandarin status – 
similar to Diệm‟s own – as evidence of their closeness to the people (Masur 
2004, 107). In 1961 Madame Nhu, Diệm‟s notorious sister-in-law, inaugurated 
a statue in honour of the two heroines with a speech linking them to the 
people of the RVN as “their proud descendants” (cited in Masur 2004, 201; 
Catton 2002, 17), thus positing a direct genealogical link between them and a 
putative Vietnamese nation. Populism, patriotism and personality cult were 
thus combined in Diệm‟s official nation-building ideology, and there is 
evidence that some southern Vietnamese did indeed regard him as a patriot 
(P. Taylor 2001, 186). At the same time as wanting to preserve the best of 
Vietnamese tradition, however, Diệm was keen to modernise the country, just 
like those progressive, early twentieth century nationalists who advocated 
reform (Catton 2002, 36).  
 
U.S. propaganda, which was disseminated in parallel to Diệm‟s, 
echoed his anti-communist message, but found it increasingly difficult to 
justify the regime‟s failure to raise living standards. It shifted from emphasising 
Diệm‟s alleged achievements to showcasing American culture, values and its 
so-called “people‟s capitalism” (Masur 2004, 87), through everything from 
sumptuous urban cultural centres to provincial theatre performances. This 
promotion of democracy, coupled with the consumer goods flooding the 
Vietnamese south under U.S. aid programmes, served to cast Diệm‟s own 
rigged elections and his autocratic, unpopular policies in an even worse light. 
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Neither was Diệm keen to fuel accusations of being America‟s „lackey‟ or 
„puppet‟ – a constant feature of VCP propaganda – amongst RVN citizens 
(Catton 2002, 28). The escalating demands of war meant that Diệm‟s 
successor, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, never developed an elaborate nation-building 
strategy, and his tenure was more about monopolising power than attempting 
to legitimate it (Beresford 1989, 54; Morris 1973, 144). Meanwhile, the 
communist regime which Diệm portrayed as having capitulated ideologically 
to the Chinese enemy was busy moulding its own nation-building project 
using much the same legitimating myths, but casting itself as the latest 
exponent of a long history of Vietnamese resistance. Some outside observers 
also espoused the view that Vietnam was an ancient nation. 
 
For theorists of nationalism, the Vietnamese case provides some 
support for the ethno-symbolist claim that a pre-modern sense of ancestry 
and identity forms the basis of modern nationalism (Smith 1986). Impressive 
archaeological finds, including pediform axe heads, burial goods and large, 
richly decorated drums, offer ample evidence of a sophisticated Bronze Age 
culture in northern Vietnam‟s Red River Delta. Linguists have found evidence 
of phonetically similar words meaning „people‟ and by extension „nation‟, 
amongst those living between the Yangtze and the Mekong rivers (Taylor 
1983, 3). Today, the Vietnamese nation is officially portrayed as having pre-
existed Chinese conquest in the first millennium C.E. and emerged with its 
cultural identity intact. Developed by the Vietnamese government‟s Institute of 
History in the 1950s and 1960s (Pelley 1995, 233), this interpretation is a 
 87 
conscious contradiction of French colonial theories characterising Vietnam as 
a withered offshoot of Chinese civilisation. 
 
The VCP continues to use the idea of national longue durée to bolster 
its own legitimacy as leader and guardian of the nation. For instance, a poster 
commemorating the party‟s fifty year jubilee adapted the familiar image of the 
Bronze Age drums by replacing their characteristic bird and boatmen motifs 
with factories and silos, setting a hammer and sickle squarely in the centre 
(Loofs-Wissowa 1991, 48). The drums also figure prominently in museums, 
shrines to Ho Chi Minh, and even the Vietnamese version of the „Wheel of 
Fortune‟ television game show. This primordialist perspective is shared by a 
number of Western scholars, a trend Tuong Vu (2007, 189) associates with 
the radicalisation of many academics in opposition to the Vietnam-American 
war. Keith Taylor‟s (1983) survey of early Vietnamese history is one of the 
most authoritative English-language statements of this position, although he 
subsequently sought to qualify it (Taylor 1998). Evans and Rowley (1984, 10) 
refer to “that loose sense of national identity that could be termed „proto-
nationalism'”. William Duiker (2000, 11) writes of a “tenacious sense of […] 
national identity” born of resistance to Chinese rule. Alexander Woodside 
(1976, 30) uses the term “national spirit” and Ken Post (1989, 86) asserts that 
by the 13th century, the Vietnamese “had become a unified people conscious 
of themselves as such and with a pantheon of heroes and heroines”. Citing 
territory, history, economy and language as unifying factors, Post (1989, 83) 
argues that the Vietnamese never forgot their independent existence before 
the millennium of Chinese rule (179 B.C.E. – 938 C.E.) and upheld customs 
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such as tattooing, teeth-blackening and betel nut chewing despite Chinese 
attempts to eradicate these. The fact that the Vietnamese took on many 
aspects of Chinese civilisation after independence, such as a legal code in 
1042 and the Confucian examination system in 1075, is interpreted as a sign 
of level-headed recognition of progressive reforms rather than evidence of 
cultural assimilation. Current school history textbooks, the contents of which 
are state controlled, present much the same view (Nguyễn et al 2006a, 18). 
Finally, several Vietnamese scholars (Pham et al 2001, 15; Dang 1998, 48) 
are of the opinion that Vietnamese nationalism‟s emphasis on the family, the 
community and villages centred around a tutelary spirit should not be equated 
with Western ideological forms. In line with ethno-symbolist scholars, however 
(A. D. Smith 1995, 57), they identify a myth of common origin as crucial to the 
sense of Vietnamese nationhood.  
 
On the other hand, the argument that nationalism is a product of 
modern circumstance also has much to commend it in the Vietnamese case 
(Vu 2007, 180). Liam Kelley (2003) has demonstrated how second millennium 
understandings of the Vietnamese realm as a “domain of manifest civility” 
were premised on a completely different world view to that of nation-states. 
This status was measured in literary output and records accessible only to the 
educated elite. It contrasts with early twentieth century nationalism, which 
spread quickly to the masses, partly due to the popularisation of romanised 
script (quốc ngữ ) that was relatively easy to master (Anderson 1991, 126). 
Although much Vietnamese tradition is rooted in village life, it is questionable 
whether this can be equated with national loyalties. Indeed, the VCP itself was 
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undecided as to the limits of the Vietnamese nation right up until the 1940s 
(Goscha 1995). Nevertheless, the mobilising force of the nation has been 
exploited by Vietnamese leaders ever since and remains fundamental to the 
VCP‟s legitimacy. Contemporary nation-building emphasises unity despite 
significant regional disparities and historical cleavages within the Vietnamese 
nation-state. The most common broad distinction made by Vietnamese today 
is between northern, central and southern Vietnam, respectively centred 
around the cities of Hanoi, Huế and Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). 
Attachments to home provinces tend to be strong too, and informal support 
networks amongst internal migrants are arranged accordingly. There is also a 
very structured recognition of ethnic minorities within Vietnam. Institutions 
such as Hanoi‟s Museum of Ethnology and the Institute of History (Pelley 
1995: 233) continue to document cultural difference within government-
defined boundaries, and the country‟s multiethnic character is enshrined in its 
constitution. Vietnam does not pursue a policy of multiculturalism, however, if 
we take this term to mean the acceptance and incoporation of “claims made 
by minority constituencies for inclusion and cultural recognition” 
(Kostakopoulou 2006, 85). This is in large part because of multiculturalism‟s 
perceived incompatibility with national unity (Stratton & Ang 1994), which is at 
the core of VCP nation-building.  
 
In Vietnam, the ethnic Vietnamese are variously described as the „elder 
brother‟ of minority groups or the “nucleus” of Vietnamese culture (Mai Quang, 
cited in Evans 1985, 125). A parallel can be drawn with the German term 
Leitkultur, or guiding culture, reputedly coined in 2000 by the Christian 
 90 
Democrat politician Friedrich Merz (Green 2004, 119). The concept has 
periodically resurfaced in political discourse since then. Its exact meaning 
remains contested, ranging from recognition of the values contained in 
Germany‟s Basic Law to advanced cultural and linguistic competence in all 
things German (Klusmeyer 2001). Left-leaning politicians tend to condemn its 
exclusivity, only to be criticised by their opponents for offering an allegedly 
wishy-washy multicultural alternative (hence the pejorative use of the term 
Multikulti). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that nation-building in both 
Germany and Vietnam “entails both a more conscious attempt to embrace the 
civic ideal and simultaneously insists on the national state being underpinned 
by the culture and traditions of its dominant or core ethnie,” understood as an 
ethnic group (A.D. Smith 1995, 106). As will be documented in the following 
chapters, this is evident from the prominence given to ethnic Vietnamese and, 
to a lesser extent, German cultural symbols as representative of the whole 
nation.   
 
 
II German nation-building 
Germany is often cited as the archetypal example of an ethnic Volksnation or 
Kulturnation, as envisaged by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
romantic movement. Its regional identities and political antecedents as a 
disparate collection of sovereign states within the Holy Roman Empire are just 
as important to understanding contemporary German federalism and nation-
building, however. The nineteenth century Prussian chancellor Bismarck was 
key to engineering the unification of the kingdoms of Bavaria, Prussia and 
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tens of other dukedoms and principalities in 1871, including Alsace and 
Lorraine newly wrested from France. Prussian territories then covered great 
swathes of modern Poland, stretching as far as the city of Königsberg, today‟s 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Romantic nationalist thinking, itself wide-
ranging and relatively marginal in political terms, cannot be taken as indicative 
of the prevailing nineteenth century sentiment; “When Gottlieb Fichte, 
Heinrich Heine, Leopold von Ranke, or Richard Wagner engaged the question 
„What is German?‟ after all, their contributions described an ambition, rather 
than a state of affairs” (Gregor et al 2006, 3).  
 
The concept of Kultur was itself contested, having associations with 
everything from high culture, through folklore and class, to religious 
confession (H. W. Smith 1995, 21). Indeed, the only thing uniting the former 
states of the Holy Roman Empire after its dissolution in 1806 was opposition 
to Napoleonic rule, which could mobilise a broad cross-section of society 
against the enemy „Other‟. Matthew Levinger (2000) shows how Prussian 
bureaucrats sought to exploit this inchoate nationalist sentiment to underpin 
their emperor‟s rule, whilst remaining remarkably ambiguous about the 
Prussian or German nature of their appeals. Aristocrats, romantics and 
republicans all sought to mould the national idea to fit their interests, 
emphasising its cultural, territorial, conservative or revolutionary potential 
accordingly. What each had in common, however, was the overriding concept 
of national unity, understood as “an ideally harmonious political community 
possessing a unitary interest and a unitary will” (Levinger 2000, 48). This 
construct was by no means a foregone conclusion. A range of alternative 
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political set-ups were thinkable (Levinger 2000, 239) and societal divisions 
continued to run deep beneath the ideal type of the unified nation. As such, 
different understandings of what constituted national culture and identity 
“divided as much as it unified society” (H. W. Smith 1995, 233). For instance, 
many forms of romantic nationalism included a strong Protestant and anti-
Semitic component which only compounded existing confessional differences. 
Religion was also central to the heated debates surrounding kleindeutsch – 
and hence predominantly Protestant - German unification, as opposed to the 
grossdeutsche Lösung including Catholic Austria (Levinger 2000, 223). 
 
Regional loyalties added to the essentially contested concept of the 
German nation throughout the nineteenth century. The states of Saxony, 
Hannover and Württemberg, for instance, sought to foster patriotism towards 
them as „Fatherlands‟ (Green 2001). Attempts to legitimate their small-scale 
monarchies through festivals, museums and history textbooks, among other 
means, much resembled nation-building in today‟s Germany and Vietnam. Yet 
they were not deemed incompatible with a larger-scale loyalty to an 
overarching, but as yet ill-defined, German nation. Although the impact of 
these policies is hard to measure, they seemed to have had some success in 
combination with local loyalty to one‟s Heimat, or homeland (Sutherland 
2001). Writing about his early-twentieth century childhood, for instance, 
former West German chancellor Kurt Kiesinger reminisced; “[W]e not only 
were citizens of the German Reich, but also, and foremost, good citizens of 
Württemberg” (cited in Weber & Kowert 2007, 70). Affiliations to Länder, or 
federal states, thus shaped some German leaders‟ post-war thinking.  
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Born into a devout Catholic background in the Rhineland, then West 
German chancellor Konrad Adenauer said in 1946; “[N]ationalism has 
experienced the strongest intellectual resistance in those catholic and 
protestant parts of Germany that least fell for the teachings of Karl Marx” 
(cited in Weber & Kowert 2007, 47). He thereby distanced himself at once 
from socialism and Prussian, state-led nationalism, to which he felt the 
Rhineland had never really subscribed. Concepts such as Heimat thus served 
as a stepping stone, rather than a hurdle, to fostering emotional attachment to 
the wider nation (Eley 2006; Applegate 1990; Confino 1997). Alon Confino 
charts how the definition of the term Heimat was gradually widened between 
1871 and 1914 to mean not only the locality, but also the nation, until the 
concept of deutsche Heimat became corrupted by Nazi ideology. However, 
Celia Applegate points out that it was “pulled out of the rubble of the Nazi 
Reich as a victim, not a perpetrator” and came to embody once more the local 
patriotism which had been discouraged by Nazism (Applegate 1990, 228). 
The Heimat became a vehicle for “speaking the unspeakable” horror of the 
Third Reich in order to transcend it (Applegate 1990, 228). 
 
It has been argued that in West Germany, identification with post-war 
economic reconstruction made a virtue out of necessity (Giesen 2001). 
Emphasis on traits such as industriousness, reliability, and efficiency helped 
to fill the gaping void left by the collapse of Nazism, and could include 
immigrants, at least in principle. Giesen (2001, 49) also points to a rejection of 
both ethnic and petit bourgeois interpretations of German identity among 
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some sections of society. This attitude was typified in the student protests of 
1968, which railed against materialism, bureaucracy and German society‟s 
perceived reluctance to come to terms with Nazism. The anti-establishment 
movement particularly deplored what it saw as the continuing government 
authoritarianism embodied in proposed emergency laws. Chancellor Willy 
Brandt, elected in 1969, accordingly proposed to „dare more democracy.‟ In 
terms of identity politics, there was a concerted attempt to engage in 
Vergangensheitsbewältigung, or coming to terms with the Nazi past, through 
heated media debates and a strong emphasis on the Third Reich in school 
history lessons. An internationalist identity also came to prominence in 1968, 
espoused by many who felt alienated from a Germany they associated with 
ossified conservatism (Davies 2007).  
 
The shadow of the Iron Curtain loomed so large over West Germany‟s 
nation-building that it completely blocked out the issue of economic migrants. 
The West German constitution, known as the Basic Law, bestowed automatic 
citizenship on all ethnic Germans living in Eastern bloc countries, including 
the GDR. Having thus taken on constitutional responsibility for millions of 
potential German arrivals, successive West German governments were 
reluctant to include the tens of thousands of labour migrants, tellingly called 
Gastarbeiter or guest workers, who were actually settling: “The very existence 
of East Germany made a redefinition of German citizenship […] difficult, as 
this would ipso facto dilute the pan-German definition taken over by West 
Germany” (Green 2004, 39). When the Iron Curtain disappeared and that 
putative pan-German state was realised, the pressing issue of ethnic 
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Germans who began arriving in droves once again pushed non-German 
immigration to the bottom of the agenda. Following the 1998 federal election, 
Gerhard Schröder‟s coalition government promised a debate which historical 
circumstance had hindered thus far. Its result, the nationality law of 2000, 
rejected the principle of life-long dual nationality and the possibly divided 
loyalties it entailed. As a direct result of vocal party and public opposition 
(Holmes Cooper 2002), citizenship for German-born children of foreigners 
was not an automatic right. It had to be sealed by a positive recognition of 
German belonging and repudiation of any other nationality by the age of 
twenty-three. The latest piece of legislation in this field is the 2005 immigration 
law. Among other measures, this ties the naturalisation process to several 
years‟ residence and the completion of a course in German language and 
civic culture. This can be interpreted as an attempt to inculcate basic 
principles of German Leitkultur in would-be citizens, as studies show these 
tests to be less about communicative competence or general knowledge and 
more about subjective impressions of how an individual „fits in‟ to German 
society. Ingrid Piller (2001, 270) points out that the German Interior Ministry's 
naturalisation criteria emphasise the applicant's ability to understand 
(passively), thus privileging a perspective whereby the applicant is expected 
to assimilate both literally (the text) and figuratively (Germanness) rather than 
play an active role in an intercultural conversation. This supports the view that 
German nation-building continues to be organised around the model of a 
dominant ethnie rather than multiculturalism. 
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In contrast to the FRG, the official identity of the former GDR was 
premised on anti-fascism from the outset. Any East German 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung was thus out of the question, as it was assumed 
that the entire East German population had been opposed to fascism. Another 
strand in GDR nation-building was internationalism. This included giving 
political asylum to like-minded „fighters against imperialism‟ fleeing 
dictatorships in Spain, Greece, Chile and elsewhere (Poutrus 2005, 120). 
Official events marking international worker solidarity were not necessarily 
reflected in everyday life, however (Kolinsky 2004). For example, the lives of 
foreigners working and studying in the GDR were strictly controlled and they 
were largely segregated from the German population in separate housing 
blocks. Workers contracted from Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique and elsewhere 
as factory labour were not encouraged to learn German or to integrate. The 
internationalist strand in government nation-building did not translate into the 
promotion of an inclusive self-understanding (Kolinsky 2004). 
 
The Cold War erected major barriers to imagining a German national 
identity not rooted in ethnicity. Despite Germany‟s division into two states, 
both East (until 1974) and West German governments maintained that it 
continued to be a single nation. Ultimately, the popular expression of this 
aspiration was decisive in bringing about a unitary state, if not a nation. „Wir 
sind ein Volk’ (we are one people) soon supplanted „Wir sind das Volk’ (we 
are the people) as the chant adopted by East Germans demonstrating for 
greater political freedom in the autumn of 1989. Today, “the peculiarity of an 
incomplete, vicarious nation-state for all Germans in the communist diaspora 
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is no more” (Joppke 1999, 95). Unification, coupled with the pressures of 
ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) and asylum seekers arriving in large numbers, 
led to a pragmatic policy shift requiring changes to united Germany‟s Basic 
Law. It is now politically possible to go about redefining German identity, and 
the incremental steps taken towards reforming citizenship law testify to this. 
However, sustained opposition to reform suggests that political culture is not 
in step with legislation, and that the idea of Germany as a country of 
immigration, let alone a multicultural melting pot, has yet to make much 
headway (Dennis & Kolinsky 2004). In 2004, then German chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder interpreted his invitation to attend commemoration of the sixtieth 
anniversary of the D-Day landings as showing that “the post-war period is 
over and done for good” (Reuters 2004). Nevertheless, Germans continue to 
deliberate over their relationship to the past and its implications for national 
identity, patriotism and pride (Green et al 2008, 19; Roberts 2000, 181). 
Almost twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the legacy of the GDR 
also continues to be the subject of public debate. In looking at how the 
“imagined community” (Anderson 1991) finds its expression in unified 
Germany, there are indications that contemporary nation-building ideology 
has not incorporated four decades of separate GDR statehood as an equally 
constituent part of national identity.  
 
Evidence suggests that some East Germans do not identify strongly 
with their current status as German citizens, due to the dominance of West 
German norms, institutions and values in public discourse since reunification 
(Schneider 2004, 171). Certain felt the speed of reunification cheated them of 
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the chance to preserve what they considered positive aspects of GDR society 
(Roberts 2000, 185). Despite the fact that a former GDR citizen, Angela 
Merkel, became German chancellor in 2005 (Berg 2005), differences in self-
understanding persist between east and west, including class ascription, 
forms of communication and attitudes towards the state. This can be partly 
attributed to the GDR‟s role in socialising its citizens (Ahbe 2004, 113). At the 
local level, for instance, this continued differentiation can be observed in 
former East and West Berliners‟ choice of newspapers, parliamentary 
representation and figures of speech (Schneider 2004, 178). One popular 
expression of difference has filtered into mainstream culture as Ostalgie, or 
nostalgia for the east, reaching a mass audience through popular films such 
as Goodbye, Lenin, the relaunch of East German products like Nudossi 
chocolate spread and the commercialisation of the distinctive figure at former 
GDR pedestrian crossings, known as the Ampelmännchen. The release of 
widely acclaimed feature films like Das Leben der Anderen (The Lives of 
Others), coupled with periodic revelations from East Germany‟s secret police 
files, also ensure that their activities remain in the public eye. The GDR 
museum, which opened in Berlin in 2006 as a private, commercial venture, 
has been criticised for riding this wave of Ostalgie. A spokesman for the 
German Historical Museum (Deutsches Historisches Museum – DHM) 
attacked its narrow focus on consumer goods, its over-emphasis on daily life 
and its lack of context (Stone 2006), something which he claimed the two 
thousand year span of his museum could provide. At the same time, the 
banalisation or even glamorisation of East German life can be interpreted as 
undermining narratives of continuous German unity (Cooke 2005) and thus 
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threatening the ideological premise of the DHM as representing two millennia 
of continuous German history. Yet an overarching sense of belonging must 
also have oiled the wheels of rapid German reunification. The so-called 
„chancellor of unity‟ Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democrat party returned to 
the idea of a shared German Kultur in order to underline continuity despite 
partition (Fulbrook 1994, 213). However, the notion of a common German 
culture and sense of belonging remains as contested today as in its 
nineteenth century usages. Indeed, unified Germany has been said to display 
“three kinds of linked consciousness: a post-communist kind for the eastern 
Länder, a somewhat bewildered move to a unified national consciousness 50 
years after World War Two; and the reach for a speculative „European‟ 
consciousness” (Wood 1998, 10). 
 
The impact of the Third Reich on Germany‟s sense of national identity 
is well documented, but the effect of the GDR past on national unity and 
memory is just as important. The abbreviation GDR was specifically used and 
encouraged by its government in order to avoid associations with both 
Germany‟s pre-war history and West Germany, its constant rival. East 
Germany‟s ruling party, the SED, upheld the notion of national unity in the 
1950s and „60s, however, before experimenting with an ill-fated form of 
„socialist nationalism‟. As in Vietnam, the SED commissioned an official 
history in order to help legitimise itself as the latest embodiment of Germany‟s 
putatively socialist character. This was complemented by the promotion of 
communist role models such as Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, but 
also cultural figures like Bach, Beethoven and Goethe, as well as the 
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renovation of Berlin‟s traditional architecture (Nothnagle 1999). Yet an 
explicitly East German citizenship was created in the late 1960s and the goal 
of German reunification excised from the GDR‟s 1974 constitution, whereas 
West Germany remained wedded to the idea of a pan-German nation 
throughout its existence. 
 
The ideological manipulation of the nation is particularly clear cut in the 
GDR case, since the SED sought to foster a national consciousness as a 
crucial boost to its legitimacy. In 1954, its then general secretary Walter 
Ulbricht used typically nationalist language at the fourth SED congress; “We 
want German unity because the Germans in the western part of our homeland 
are our brothers, because we love our fatherland, because we know that the 
restoration of German unity is an unavoidable aspect of the logic of history” 
(cited in McKay 1998, 15). To this extent, it is remarkably similar to a speech 
made a year earlier by then West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer on a 
visit to the United States; “[R]eunification shall be achieved only in peace and 
freedom. We, in the West of Germany, will not submit to the Soviet yoke in 
order to reunite with our brethren in the East as a Russian satellite state. We 
shall not do so because we would thereby betray our compatriots in the East 
who expect us to maintain our freedom so that they, too, can share it one day 
again” (cited in Weber & Kowert 2007, 63). Ulbricht, however, understood 
national unity in terms of working class solidarity. He assumed that class 
could undermine nation, and aimed to extend the socialist system to West 
Germany. Adenauer, on the other hand, would only countenance a „free‟ 
Germany. Since they did not consider reunification without either socialist 
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revolution or democracy a worthy goal, both subordinated nationalism to their 
respective ideologies. Each nonetheless upheld the ultimate aim of unity, 
despite the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The SED soon found it 
increasingly difficult to square this with its promotion of a „socialist national 
consciousness‟ specific to East Germany, however (Meuschel 1992, 291). 
The renaming of institutions without the word „German‟, for instance, 
remained patchy and confusing, indicating inconsistencies in the SED‟s 
message, which would dog its attempts to influence GDR citizens‟ 
understanding of nationhood.  
 
In 1969, then West German chancellor Willy Brandt‟s formulation of 
„two states in one nation‟ contrasted with Walter Ulbricht‟s emphasis on state 
sovereignty over national unity. Brandt understood the nation as a 
combination of historical reality and political will, which went beyond a 
common language and culture to encompass a shared feeling of belonging 
(Meuschel 1992, 276). Despite his diplomatic overtures to the East, known as 
Ostpolitik, Brandt‟s assertion of ongoing national unity served to justify the 
FRG‟s continued refusal to recognise the GDR as a sovereign state, 
Conversely, Ulbricht‟s decision to abandon his earlier claim of German unity in 
1970 had a lot to do with his increasingly precarious position as leader, 
differences with the Soviet Union, and retaliation at Brandt‟s use of the unity 
concept to thwart GDR ambitions to join the United Nations. Ulbricht began to 
question the unity of German culture and language, which he considered 
Americanised in the FRG, “contaminated by imperialism and manipulated by 
capitalism” (cited in McKay 1998, 55).  This position continued under his 
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successor, Erich Honecker, who oversaw a hardening of the SED‟s stance 
towards the FRG as a „foreign country‟ in the early 1970s. This was another 
confusing reversal which flowed from a policy of Abgrenzung, meaning 
demarcation or separation (Ludz 1977, 222). The SED‟s pursuit of external 
state sovereignty had entailed a repudiation of the German nation, although 
survey evidence at the time suggested that East Germans were able to 
distinguish between state and nation, and even see the GDR as their 
„fatherland‟ without prejudice to accepting the continued existence of a historic 
and cultural German nation  (McKay 1998, 92). These differences between 
popular understanding and ideological manipulation exemplify Karl 
Mannheim‟s (1991 [1929], 49) distinction between total and particular national 
ideologies. 
 
The GDR‟s 1974 constitution replaced references to the German nation 
and national unity with an emphasis on the socialist character of the state 
(Ludz 1977, 223). Tellingly, in 1970, Brezhnev had summed up the German 
question as follows; “ [N]ever forget that without us, the Soviet Union, with our 
power and strength, the GDR would not exist […] Germany does not exist 
anymore and it is better that way. There is the socialist GDR and the 
imperialist FRG” (cited in McKay 1998, 57). The SED did try to replace an 
ethnically and historically grounded conception of Germanness with a 
„socialist national consciousness‟, albeit one which appropriated suitable 
German historical figures. The official introduction of a distinction between the 
concepts of „nation‟ and „nationality‟ in late 1974 came as a belated theoretical 
justification for the glaring contradictions and inconsistencies in this policy 
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(Meuschel 1992, 281). A 1975 article in the party organ, Neues Deutschland 
(the name of which was never „degermanised‟) explained that the “complexity 
of ethnic characteristics, traits and features of a population is described as 
„nationality‟. Therefore the concept of nationality is narrower than the concept 
of the nation, and what is more, not the most decisive” (cited in McKay 1998, 
109). Despite this nice academic distinction, which rescued German history 
and culture whilst subordinating them to the overriding strength of socialist 
principles, the SED‟s nation-building ideology suffered from being too 
obviously instrumental, top-down and authoritarian. This is in contrast to the 
gradual socialisation and lived experience of former GDR citizens, which 
continue to influence their identities and personal ideologies to this day.  
  
German reunification was a unique event; never before had two 
developed welfare states been brought together so quickly or 
comprehensively (Lehmbruch 1993, 32). The chosen method was accession 
under Article 23 of West Germany‟s Basic Law. A preliminary treaty between 
the two states in May 1990 preceded unification on October 3rd of the same 
year. Originally conceived as a caretaker document in 1949, the Basic Law 
would actually become the constitution of the united German state almost 
overnight, leaving East Germans to grapple with their new status as citizens 
of a united Germany. The hurdles to be overcome in the eleven months 
between the fall of the Berlin wall and unification were enormous. This 
process was legitimated by the GDR‟s first and only free elections of March 
1990, in which the conservative Alliance for Democracy‟s majority was 
interpreted as an endorsement of Helmut Kohl‟s quick reunification policy 
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(Lehmbruch 1993, 26). Expectations in the East were high. Even if standards 
of living were relatively good there compared to other Eastern bloc countries, 
they could not compete with the images of West German affluence reaching 
GDR television sets, and the SED regime continually measured itself both 
practically and ideologically against its neighbour. There would inevitably be 
disappointment. As soon as the wall came down, East Germans faced huge 
challenges, including the revision of rents, the introduction of the West 
German pension and benefit system, the fear that their homes might be 
repossessed by pre-war landowners, and unemployment (Kolinsky 1995). 
These changes caused untold mental strain. The status of pensioners, single 
parents, women, young people and the relatively privileged was turned upside 
down as the existing social system disappeared. For instance, the 
overwhelming majority of East Germans were accustomed to a way of life 
which revolved around their Betrieb, or workplace (Kolinsky 1995, 22). Yet 
every second family in the Leipzig area is estimated to have experienced the 
economic, social and psychological consequences of unemployment in the 
five years following unification (Kolinsky 1995, 71).  
  
Although the influence of SED ideology on its former citizens is an 
important feature of East German socialisation, this must be distinguished 
from the regime‟s total ideology. Wolf Biermann, a famous East German poet 
and singer-songwriter who fell foul of the authorities there and was expelled in 
1976, describes the sense of alienation and difference he felt living in West 
Germany; “I came from Germany to Germany, I could speak the language but 
didn‟t understand a word. Why? Because the system of cultural and political 
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references in which I found myself was so different to the one I knew. I felt as 
though I was in a foreign land” (Spiegel 2006b).i Biermann did not regard 
West Germany as a foreign land until he experienced it as such, since he 
spoke German and enjoyed West German citizenship by virtue of Article 116 
of the Basic Law. He claims that he would rather have been exiled to Poland 
or the Soviet Union, because they had the same “social structure” as the GDR 
(Spiegel 2006b). This underlines how deeply the GDR regime, modelled on 
the Soviet system, had affected Biermann‟s ability to relate to his fellow 
Germans across the border and live a normal life there. It also gives a sense 
of the disorientation felt in 1989 by East Germans, who even struggled with 
everyday tasks like grocery shopping due to the glut of unfamiliar products 
which suddenly became available (Confino & Fritzsche 2002). Despite failing 
in its state legitimating function, at least one analyst concludes that GDR 
ideology left behind;  
[A] distinctive outlook on life, an unmistakably East German use of 
language, a vast constellation of shattered dreams and hurt feelings, a 
widespread distrust of „Western‟ values, a general inability to look 
critically at the recent past and at one‟s own role in it, a unique setting 
of priorities molded by forty years of life in a socialist society and 
unremitting assaults by the SED‟s myth-building machine. For better or 
worse, the new united Germany now lives with this legacy (Nothnagle 
1999, 38).  
 
The idea of a single German nation, as enshrined in the Basic Law, 
West German citizenship legislation, and East German demonstrators‟ chants 
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of „We are one people‟ (Wir sind ein Volk) in 1989, did not correspond to lived 
experience before and after unification. In his unique anthropological study of 
East and West Berlin before 1989, John Borneman (1992, 22) refers to the 
building of the wall in 1961 as “a realization of what already had been a 
divided community in the political imagination of the residents”. That is, the 
creation of a physical barrier entrenched already established and diverging 
nation-building projects premised on communism and capitalism, Soviet and 
Western alliances respectively. When the wall crumbled, so did the apparatus 
of state security, national myth-making and self-censorship which had 
characterised the GDR regime. In its place came a rapid and wholesale 
adoption of the West German model (McKay 1998, 157).  Despite initial 
euphoria, however, this did not and could not erase GDR citizens‟ completely 
different socialisation, leading to a gap between the official ideological basis of 
the new „Berlin republic‟ and their own „particular‟ ideological identification with 
the united German nation.  
 
In the first pan-German election of 1990, the Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD) candidate, Oskar 
Lafontaine, was embarrassed by the national question, leaving it up to the 
incumbent Christian Democrats to shape the new national discourse (Berger 
1994, 59). Chancellor Helmut Kohl represented the nation in terms of a 
prosperous political order modelled on West Germany and anchored within 
the EU, but open to all German Landsleute, or fellow countrymen (Borneman 
1992, 318). This reassuring reference to compatriots was vague and inclusive 
enough for East and West Germans alike to conjure up their own mental 
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images of where and to what they belonged. Yet one factor indicating 
disillusionment with post-unification life is a resurgence in Eastern support for 
the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus – 
PDS), the SED‟s successor, which merged with another left-wing group to 
form Die Linke in 2007.  
 
With reference to the GDR, the former PDS leader Gabrielle Zimmer 
contrasted the difficulties those born in the 1940s and growing up under 
Stalinist influence had with nationhood to those of her later generation, who 
identified with the GDR in a less ideological, politicised way and found the 
idea of national belonging and pride less problematic; “[I]t is a question of 
seeking an identity in place rather than ideology. Paradoxically, the collapse 
of Stalinism as an ideology has emptied the GDR of its political content and 
left a shell of memories of Heimat, order and stability” (Thompson 2002, 125).  
Members of Zimmer‟s GDR generation were also less ambivalent about 
national identity than those of their West German counterparts who 
participated in the youth movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Brunssen 2002, 
21). Nonetheless, embracing post-unity German identity was far from 
straightforward for Gabrielle Zimmer or other Eastern Germans, regardless of 
their political persuasion. Some rekindled regional loyalties to the likes of 
Saxony (Szejnmann 2002). Others, ironically, regarded the GDR as a 
“retrospectively imagined community” (Thompson 2002, 128), one which forty 
years of SED propaganda could not impose but which former citizens adopted 
in hindsight To them it represented the sense of community and stability 
which they yearned for when confronted with the hectic and confusing pace of 
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capitalism and globalisation in united Germany. This was emphatically not a 
hankering after past authoritarianism and, to the extent that it was political at 
all, represented more of a negative reaction to neo-liberalism.  
 
Distinguishing politicisation from socialisation in this way was not 
difficult for former GDR citizens who had grown used to separating ideological 
allegiance to the SED‟s „socialist nationalist consciousness‟ from everyday life 
and loyalties (Cooke 2005, 7). However, it was precisely a perceived inability 
in post-unification discourse to deal with the GDR in a nuanced and 
differentiated way which rankled with many. Their experience of „everyday 
socialism‟ seemed to set them apart from their Western German counterparts, 
though a parallel could be drawn with the consciously depoliticised nature of 
post-war West German identity; “If the West Germans had the economic 
miracle and a form of patriotism rooted in the strength of the German mark as 
a substitute identity then the East Germans had their antiquarian so-called 
niche existence. What both had in common was a propensity not to examine 
the underlying geo-strategic and historical conditions” (Thompson 2002, 131). 
Despite its origins as the successor party to the SED, the PDS is just as much 
about capturing those voters who identify with „everyday socialism‟ as those 
who espouse the ideology itself, hence its own use of the term Heimat in party 
materials to evoke a sense of familiarity and belonging to a retrospectively 
imagined community (Hough 2005). 
 
 Mary Fulbrook (2001) discusses “the creation of two German societies” 
between 1945 and 1990, an observation which in itself chips away at the 
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notion of ongoing national unity; “Ultimately, a common language, a common 
heritage, and a residual sense of common national identity, were fractured by 
deep-rooted and extensive differences in the very constitution of social 
classes, life chances, cultural attitudes and patterns of behaviour” (Fulbrook 
2001, 245). At the same time, it could be argued that unification was in some 
ways constitutive of an ex post facto GDR identity, as former citizens were 
confronted with contrasting East and West German socialisation (Cooke 
2005, 7). Both conclusions do much to undermine the myth of German unity 
on which the taken for granted term „reunification‟ is premised. Furthermore, 
the nature of this narrative, laden in favour of both Western capitalist norms 
and an ethnic understanding of the Kulturnation, contains a contradiction and 
an imbalance inimical to the very project of present and future national 
integration; “On the one hand, both parts of Germany must grow together 
after unification. And this integration takes place in the name of ethnic 
belonging. On the other hand, the integration of immigrants cannot be 
undertaken in the name of an ethnic nation” (von Thadden, cited in von Dirke 
1994, 532).ii  
 
Vietnam and Germany share experience of state division and 
communist government. In the Vietnamese case, communist control became 
nationwide with the fall of Saigon on April 30th 1975 and the creation of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) from the DRV and the RVN in 1976. This 
political system remains in place, despite the opening up (đổi mới) to capital 
markets and foreign investment ushered in by the 1986 Communist Party 
Congress. State planning and subsidies have been rolled back in some areas, 
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including health and education, encouraging the participation of civil society in 
building a „socialist market economy‟ (Thai 2001). In Germany, the 3rd of 
October 1990 marked the official end of East German communism with the 
accession of the GDR to the FRG.  GDR identity was an ideological construct 
like any other nation-building tool, but its myths and symbols were more 
overtly ideological and its creation relatively recent and raw. It offered 
disembodied anti-fascism where the FRG offered reassuring territorial 
continuity; the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1973 that the FRG was 
„partially identical‟ with the pre-Nazi Reich, for instance (Knischewski 1996, 
133). From 1954 to 1990, the FRG celebrated the „Day of German Unity‟ on 
17th June. This commemorated the GDR worker uprising in 1953, which it 
interpreted as expressing a desire for reunification (Knischewski 1996,132). 
Although West Germany‟s calls for unity changed over time - the FRG 
recognising GDR sovereignty in 1972 - they continuously enabled the 
truncated West German state to construct a coherent claim to represent the 
whole nation. When the time came in 1989, the FRG set about soldering the 
states according to its own designs. Chancellor Kohl‟s use of rhetoric like “„our 
German fatherland‟, „our compatriots in the GDR‟, and „two states in 
Germany‟” (Knischewski 1996, 140) helped prepare the ground for rapid 
reunification. The discourse of unity thus remained a constant in the DRV and 
SRV, as well as in the pre and post-unification FRG. Both the Vietnamese and 
East German communist parties also sought to combine nation-building and 
socialist ideology in order to legitimate their regimes, with very different 
results.   
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The DRV was at war for most of its existence. Far from being eclipsed 
by communist ideology, the narrative of Vietnamese resistance to invasion 
and myths of national resilience and determination continuously fuelled its war 
effort. Nation-building after World War II blended anti-colonialism, ancient 
myth and revolutionary fervour, a potent mix personified in the tradition of 
honouring national heroes like „Uncle Ho‟. At the same time, Ho‟s communist 
credentials constitute a central legitimating link between the present 
government and Vietnam‟s struggles for independence. The cult of DRV war 
heroes - and explicitly not RVN war dead, whose graves have been neglected 
and in some cases razed (Schwenkel 2008, 60) - represents another 
legitimating tool. Monuments erected to war heroes, and particularly those to 
„patriots and revolutionaries‟, link their bravery to Vietnam‟s hard-won 
independence and to the VCP as leader of the revolution (Malarney 2001; 
Dixon 2004, 17). As such, they continue to be central to the Vietnamese 
government‟s legitimacy today; “[The Vietnam-American] war was the 
mother‟s milk, the school and the testing-ground of Vietnamese communism. 
It provides historical justification for the indispensable leadership of the 
Communist Party” (Pham 2005, no page). The East German SED, on the 
other hand, attempted to supplement its anti-fascist discourse with reference 
to home-grown communists, but faced difficulties in accounting for critiques of 
Lenin penned by the likes of Rosa Luxembourg (Terray 1995, 192). 
References to Karl Marx and Martin Luther were also ambivalent as, contrary 
to the FRG, the GDR was unwilling to assume responsibility for acts which did 
not support the dominant ideology (such as Luther‟s condemnation of the 
1524 peasant revolt). In 1980, SED secretary general Erich Honecker 
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commented archly; “We cannot possibly run the risk of celebrating the same 
national heroes as the FRG since you will search in vain for institutions 
bearing the names of Nazi greats in our country” (cited in McKay 1998, 124). 
Although it also sought to co-opt eminent cultural figures into its national 
pantheon, the GDR could not exploit links to a magnificent ancient civilization, 
as was the VCP‟s good fortune.  
  
The bronze drums which have been found in northern Vietnam are 
generally dated to between 700 and 1000 B.C.E. However, in a conflation of 
history and myth, nationalist rhetoric does not shy away from asserting 
Vietnam‟s even more ancient origins by evoking the legendary dynasty of 
Hùng Kings (Pelley 1995, 233). Ho Chi Minh himself is quoted as saying; “The 
Kings Hung (sic) have founded the country; as for us, we must safeguard it” 
(cited in Dang 1998, 44). Archaeological interpretation is thus put to use in 
legitimating the VCP as the latest in a long line of leaders representing the 
Vietnamese nation. This trend is likely to continue as other credentials 
associated with war veterans fade with the generations, and new forms of 
collective action  distinct from mass organisations such as the Fatherland 
Front, become more vocal in Vietnam (Luong 2003, 24; Malarney 1997, 917). 
The “postcolonial cult of antiquity” (Pelley 1998, 375) also has an impact on 
the VCP‟s regionalist discourse. One example is Vietnam‟s contribution to the 
ASEAN culture week, which took place in Hanoi and Halong City in 2004. The 
Vietnamese section of the opening performance featured an array of dancers 
in feathered headdresses, vaguely reminiscent of the characters etched on 
archaeological artefacts. The prominently displayed replica of a bronze drum 
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made it clear that this was an evocation of the country‟s pre-Chinese, Bronze 
Age culture, appropriately entitled „Dance of the Ancient Viet‟. Although similar 
drums have been found elsewhere in Southeast Asia, some of the oldest 
artefacts have been uncovered in Vietnam. As such, this symbolism evokes 
both a shared regional heritage and a „race to antiquity‟ among ASEAN 
member states (Loofs-Wissowa 1993). It remains to be seen how united 
Vietnam and Germany reconcile nation-building with regionalism more 
generally.   
 
III Investing in regional integration 
2007 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the EU and ASEAN‟s fortieth jubilee. 
ASEAN remains an eminently flexible, intergovernmental organisation based 
on member state consensus, and is unencumbered by any supranational 
institutions beyond a permanent secretariat and a series of regular meetings. 
In this sense, ASEAN differs greatly from the EU, but this does not rule out 
fruitful comparisons. Despite being “at opposite ends of the spectrum of 
institutionalised regionalism” (Wunderlich 2006, 2) their fundamentally 
different nature represents unique responses to international challenges that 
have been shaped and developed by member states and, in the EU case, its 
own institutions. Both organisations were born of a shared desire to promote 
peace and development, but adopted very different principles and strategies 
in pursuing that aim. Member state understandings of nation-building are one 
amongst many contextual factors contributing to this divergence. This section 
argues that it was primarily in Vietnamese and German national interests to 
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take part in regional integration, for historical, political and strategic reasons. 
Accordingly, regionalism is an integral part of their nation-building ideologies.  
 
When West Germany became a founding member of the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1952, going on to participate in the European 
Economic Community from 1957, it saw this as a means to forge a lasting 
alliance with its erstwhile enemy, France, to underpin its economic recovery 
with a free trade area and to be rehabilitated as a respected partner on the 
international political arena following World War II. Other European countries, 
as well as the United States of America, saw a pressing need to tie West 
Germany securely to the anti-Soviet bloc in the escalating Cold War, and to 
monitor the country‟s reconstruction by integrating key aspects of European 
trade and industry. Similarly ASEAN, founded in 1967 by Thailand, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, had an important, if implicit, anti-
communist element (pace Tarling 2006, 135). All of its original members 
feared the impact of domestic and international communist movements on 
state stability. As a result, one of ASEAN‟s goals was to provide a regional 
bulwark against communism in Indochina, consisting of Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos. Today, however, the loose set of guidelines known as the „ASEAN 
way‟ corresponds to key principles of Vietnamese diplomacy as laid down at 
the ninth VCP Congress in 2001, namely non-interference and respect for 
independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Vietnam‟s current focus on 
developing international ties is closely linked to its socio-economic 
development, for which it requires technical expertise and assistance, whilst 
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continuing to profess an ideological commitment to the international proletariat 
and socialism.  
 
IV Vietnamese regionalism 
Vietnam‟s membership of ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation), as well as sub-regional initiatives surrounding the Mekong 
Basin (Dosch & Hensengerth 2005) signals its readiness to engage in 
supranational dialogue, if not deep integration. The sixth VCP Congress in 
1986 saw the introduction of an open door policy known as đổi mới, meaning 
renovation. This brought with it major changes in domestic policy, including 
the property regime and economic reforms. Despite these, the VCP continues 
to cling to its interpretation of „one-party democracy‟. It hopes that Vietnam‟s 
rapid growth, averaging 7.2% in the decade to 2005 (Economist 2008, 238), 
will cement the party‟s legitimacy and its interpretation of national identity, 
rather than encouraging calls for greater political pluralism. The current revival 
of religious observance amongst Vietnam‟s urban elites, for instance, has 
been interpreted as both an individual response to social change and part of 
“state attempts to strengthen national identifications as a counterbalance to its 
policies of economic liberalisation” (Taylor 2003, 383). Taking place a few 
years before the collapse of European communism, the sixth VCP Congress 
also heralded changes in Vietnam‟s foreign policy, and by extension in the 
official portrayal of national self-understanding. This was strongly linked to its 
continuing nation-building efforts.  
 
 116 
Vietnamese leaders‟ references to unleashing the nation‟s „inner 
strength‟ recalled traditions of national determination and resistance. They 
also attempted to counter disillusionment that decades of war did not bring an 
end to hardship and privations; “Relative poverty more than 25 years after 
reunification has hurt the pride of the nation” (Dosch and Ta 2004, 203). The 
VCP now claims that the strong will, dynamism, creativity and effort of the 
Vietnamese people were successfully harnessed by đổi mới and effective 
state management (Tran 2005, 13), although people had to be at least as 
resourceful before then to make ends meet despite state policies. During the 
1970s, Vietnam had been suspicious of whether ASEAN supported “genuine 
neutrality” (Narine 2002, 40), given the foreign military bases in Malaysia and 
the Philippines, as well as Thailand and the Philippines‟ support for the U.S. in 
the Vietnam-American war. Throughout the 1980s, ASEAN and Vietnam were 
on opposite sides of a stand-off over Cambodia (then Kampuchea), where the 
murderous Khmer Rouge regime had been toppled by a Vietnamese invasion 
in 1978 and replaced by a client government. Vietnam presented this as a 
humanitarian intervention. ASEAN saw it as a move to assert Vietnamese 
dominance over communist Indochina, thereby directly threatening 
neighbouring Thailand. This conflict realised ASEAN‟s fears of communist 
advance. 
 
Vietnam‟s attempts to draw closer to its ASEAN neighbours in the run-
up to the 1978 invasion made it all the more shocking when it came. ASEAN 
member states were united in condemnation but divided on an appropriate 
strategic response (Narine 2002, 45). ASEAN‟s prestige as an international 
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diplomatic partner was raised through diplomatic initiatives such as the 
International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981. However, internal tensions 
between Thailand and Indonesia in particular, coupled with the Superpowers‟ 
pursuit of divergent interests in the region, highlighted ASEAN‟s limited clout. 
Vietnam, which had declared its intention to withdraw all troops from 
Cambodia by 1990, accelerated the process as its Soviet ally became weaker 
and its own domestic reforms demanded external support, notably the 
normalisation of relations with China and the resumption of suspended aid. 
Despite the diplomatic stalemate, economic cooperation with ASEAN 
improved in the 1980s and Vietnam openly indicated its desire eventually to 
become a member. Trade finally trumped tension with the Paris Peace Treaty 
of 1991, which determined Cambodia‟s future under the aegis of the United 
Nations. Vietnam‟s accession to ASEAN in 1995 signalled its readiness to 
pursue regionalism as part of its continuing nation-building project. This step 
can be seen as part of a wider strategy in response to the collapse of 
communism, premised on the view that “regional institutions can assist the 
state-building process” (Narine 2004, 444). 
   
The tension between the theory and practice of ASEAN integration can 
be added to that between national interests and ASEAN credibility, as well as 
institution-building and actual cooperation (Boisseau du Rocher 1998, 107). If 
regionalism is about fostering mutual understanding and international 
prestige, it is also about reinforcing each member state‟s domestic legitimacy 
(Boisseau du Rocher 1998, 107). Just as state visits have an important 
symbolic function (viz. Bill Clinton‟s visit to Vietnam in 2000 as the first U.S. 
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president to set foot in unified Vietnam), so the symbolism of ASEAN 
cooperation is at least as significant as its concrete achievements. In 
ideological terms, it was of prime importance for the founding members to 
signal their unity vis-à-vis what they considered the Vietnamese threat 
throughout the 1970s and, in the 1980s, against domestic instability in the 
Philippines and elsewhere. Yet only after the end of the Vietnamese –
American war did ASEAN heads of government first come together to be 
formally associated with the fledgling organisation, whose affairs had hitherto 
been left to foreign ministers. The 1976 Bali summit not only gave the 
organisation a higher profile, but also resulted in the decision to create a more 
robust institutional structure. By the 1990s, the end of the Cold War, peace in 
Cambodia and the departure of U.S. troops from the Philippines called for 
new impetus. The Singapore summit in 1992 accordingly focused on 
economic and security cooperation, as well as the need to restructure ASEAN 
internally. The agreement to create an Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) can be 
understood as a response to the creation of a single market in the EU and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), even if actual progress on 
reducing tariff barriers has been slow. Another ASEAN initiative, the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) joined the congeries of groupings 
testifying to political will, if not assiduous implementation. ASEAN‟s slow 
reaction to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and lacklustre condemnation of the 
Burmese government‟s spectacular failings further demonstrate the misfit 
between symbolic cooperation and concrete action.  
 
 119 
By the year 2000, Vietnam had diplomatic ties with one hundred and 
sixty-seven countries, compared to twenty-three states sharing its ideological 
opposition to capitalism in 1989 (Dosch and Ta 2004, 197). ASEAN‟s 
integration of its erstwhile enemy was a sign of changing times. The 
Vietnamese government was anxious to end its isolation as a political pariah 
and become an accepted partner for regional and international trade and 
investment. ASEAN‟s founding members, in turn, were keen to unite against a 
new threat in the post-Cold War era, that of regional insignificance. 
Sandwiched between the fast-developing economies of India and China, they 
wanted to assert themselves on a newly-configured world stage and resist 
outsiders‟ attempts to impose their will on the region (Ramcharan 2003). It 
was unthinkable that regional integration could be at the expense of strong 
state sovereignty. On the contrary, in member states‟ regionalist thinking, 
sovereignty was seen as a “necessary prerequisite” (Narine 2004, 444, 
emphasis in original).  
 
ASEAN functions according to the principles of non-interference and 
decision-making by consensus, known collectively as „the ASEAN way‟. Its 
emphasis on respecting territorial sovereignty offers a means of reconciling 
regionalisation with nation-building. Vietnam, long considered a destabilizing 
factor in the region, has made conspicuous efforts to demonstrate both its 
regional commitment and ability to lead, hosting ASEAN summits, initiating 
the ASEAN culture week and organising other regional events such as the 
2003 South-East Asian games, the 2004 Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) and 
the 2006 APEC summit in Hanoi. This helps to strengthen perceptions of 
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South-East Asia as a region, at least among elites, whilst establishing 
Vietnam as an international player (Sutherland 2005b). Vietnam has carefully 
constructed its move from describing ASEAN as a hostile, capitalist, „NATO-
type‟ organisation to embracing membership. The VCP now claims that “the 
present enemy of Vietnam is poverty and backwardness, and the friend of 
Vietnam is everybody who is willing to co-operate with and help us to push 
back poverty and backwardness” (Tran, cited in Dosch and Ta 2004, 200). 
This militaristic rhetoric recalls not only that of the war years, but also the 
official language of struggle and heroism used since then to motivate the 
population in facing new challenges (P. Taylor 2001, 28). ASEAN 
membership thereby plays both to domestic legitimacy and external 
sovereignty; it helps define a new enemy against which the VCP can lead the 
people, whilst at the same time seeking to bolster its international recognition.  
 
Membership of ASEAN signals a shift from military to political and 
economic security. Although Vietnam still officially pursues „socialist 
construction‟ in the creation of a „socialist market economy‟, this rhetoric has 
not hindered substantial foreign direct investment and development aid from 
both donor countries and international organisations like the World Bank. After 
all, “the Vietnamese bureaucracy is well schooled in slogans” (Templer 1998, 
148) and its stated commitment to reform has been conducive to international 
cooperation. Despite important regional and ethnic disparities and a growing 
income differential (Luong 2003, 16), Vietnam‟s success in reducing poverty 
since the 1990s makes it attractive to aid agencies, which are keen to see 
their projects lead to measurable results. Yet Vietnam retains a vigorous “self-
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belief” (Gainsborough 2002, 704) derived from its national myth of resistance, 
which makes it less vulnerable to international pressure than neighbouring 
states such as Laos and Cambodia. Foreign aid donors have found this to 
their cost; the democratic agenda behind the World Bank‟s good governance 
programme has made little headway in Vietnam, for instance (Zingerli 2004, 
55). Instead, the Vietnamese government implements its explicit aim of 
“absorbing external resources long and consistently (sic)” (VCP Central 
Committee 1997, cited in Dinh 2006, 9) whilst “ensuring independence, self-
control and socialist orientation” (Polit Bureau 2001, cited in Dinh 2006, 10). 
For the time being, the „ASEAN way‟ poses no threat to that vision. On the 
contrary, it is calculated to strengthen international economic and political 
clout whilst maintaining ideological orthodoxy at home. Both internal and 
external sovereignty must be secure for Vietnam to countenance any form of 
cooperation, including regional integration.  
 
Given that respect for national sovereignty is a core feature of the 
„ASEAN Way‟, (Palmujoki 2001, 8), ASEAN member states would dispute the 
following assessment of the concept; 
 
[S]tate sovereignty has been eroded by the notion that the international 
community has obligations towards individual members of other states. 
Action on this idea of political legitimacy runs counter to the notion of the 
territorial integrity of states and the absolute sovereignty of states over 
their internal affairs (Moore 2001, 46). 
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Neither do they appreciate external interference from outside the region. 
ASEAN member states are hostile towards attempts by the likes of the EU to 
tie human rights conditionality clauses to trade agreements, for instance. In 
some cases, they justify this using arguments that human rights are not 
universal or that „Asian values‟ prioritise so-called second generation rights – 
to work, for instance – over first generation human rights like freedom of 
speech, association and religion (Sutherland 2006b). Member states see the 
ability to present a united front against international pressures as a positive 
feature of the organisation, although the failings of fellow member states such 
as Burma are also a source of embarrassment (Agence France Presse 2006). 
When the ASEAN Culture Week took place in Hanoi and Hải Phòng in 2004, 
Vietnam‟s then Prime Minister Phan Văn Khải expressed his support for 
ASEAN‟s fundamental principles and “the flexible and wise combination of the 
interests of each nation and of the whole region” (Vietnam News 2004). 
Indeed, the Vietnamese government first initiated the ASEAN culture week as 
a means of „„fostering a sense of regional identity‟‟ (ASEAN Secretariat 2004). 
Declarations of principle can be an effective way of signalling unity without 
ceding sovereignty. It is unclear, for instance, whether Vietnam would accept 
the proposed ASEAN human rights commission (International Herald Tribune 
2007), with all the implications for domestic sovereignty this entails. This is 
one instance where Vietnam‟s regionalist rhetoric conflicts with the pressure 
of actual regionalisation. Nevertheless, the strategic advantage of ASEAN 
membership in strengthening South-East Asia‟s presence on the world stage 
is not currently tempered by lost sovereignty or onerous international 
constraints, and so does not undermine Vietnam‟s nation-building ideology. 
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The key consideration underpinning the future of ASEAN remains unchanged; 
“[T]he best prospect for institutional development in the Asia-Pacific is still that 
states believe that regional institutions can assist the state-building process” 
(Narine 2004, 444). 
 
Despite lofty aspirations, enshrined in ASEAN‟s Hanoi (1999) and 
Vientiane (2004) Action Plans, the organisation remains resolutely 
intergovernmental. Moves towards creating an Asian Free Trade Area have 
made slow progress, despite ambitions for a regional economic zone 
modelled on the European Union by 2015 (Tuổi Trẻ Online 2006). 
Vietnamese foreign policy continues to be officially articulated in nationalist 
and socialist terms. In turn, this is linked to principles of Ho Chi Minh‟s 
thought, which has been put on a par with Marxist-Leninist doctrine in 
Vietnam. One of the VCP‟s central, explicit aims is to develop the economy in 
order to narrow the gap with regional neighbours. The new focus on 
„economic emulation‟ over Cold War cleavages, however, is couched in a firm 
and oft-repeated commitment to upholding “national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, national unification” (Dinh 2006, 1). The VCP‟s regionalism is 
premised on its potential to rescue or “buttress” (Milward 1994, 3) the nation-
state without even symbolically „pooling‟ sovereignty at the ASEAN level. The 
regionalist element in Vietnam‟s nation-building discourse can well afford to 
be positive, as it currently offers the „win-win‟ prospect of enhancing both 
domestic legitimacy and external sovereignty.  
 
 
 124 
V German regionalism 
The core aim of the 1950 Schumann declaration, which prepared the ground 
for the European Coal and Steel Community as the first step in European 
integration, was to make war “materially impossible”. This was to be achieved 
by locking the major powers of France and Germany, who had been at war 
three times in the past century, into cooperation over vital defence industries. 
It was also clear to the six founding members and other Western powers like 
the United States and the United Kingdom that European integration was a 
means of controlling Germany economically and politically (Anderson 2005, 
78). In turn, the preamble of the West German Basic Law unequivocally 
anchored it within the European project, as “an equal member of a united 
Europe”. The prominence given to this self-understanding signals the 
importance of European integration as a positive focus of German identity. 
Despite being predominantly economic in practice, integration was always a 
highly political project for successive West German governments, entrenching 
the FRG ideologically as a member of the Western bloc and in opposition to 
the GDR. Economic integration also fitted well with the identity-promoting 
aspects of the FRG‟s post-war Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle.  
 
West Germany‟s first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was committed to 
building trust with international partners, particularly France; “If this meant 
subordinating the German state to Western or European political institutions, 
he was not inclined to object” (Weber & Kowert 2007, 51). In this he 
fundamentally disagreed with the opposition leader of the social democrats 
(SPD), Kurt Schumacher, who advocated German self-determination as a 
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precondition for international cooperation, and not vice versa (Schweiger 
2007, 45). Schumacher believed that respect for national rights would prevent 
a return to right-wing nationalism, whereas Adenauer was of the view that 
German affairs, including the question of unification, would have to be 
embedded in a multilateral, but resolutely Western approach. Adenauer was 
under no illusions that reunification was unrealistic in the prevailing Cold War 
climate. However, his Westpolitik would come to be complemented by Willy 
Brandt‟s Ostpolitik during Brandt‟s time as foreign minister in a grand 
SPD/CDU coalition from 1966-69, and then as chancellor of an SPD/FDP 
coalition from 1969 until his resignation in 1974. This Ostpolitik included direct 
contact with the GDR (rather than through the Soviet Union) and recognition 
of the Oder-Neisse line as marking Germany‟s eastern border. Brandt was 
also committed to pursuing national unity, which he carefully distinguished 
from right-wing nationalism. Some continuity in government policy can be 
seen in the extent to which Brandt, like Adenauer, valued informal 
multilateralism and trust-building over a strict, legalistic approach to 
international relations. Again like Adenauer, Brandt also emphasised an 
internationally embedded Germany as a precondition of unity; “There can only 
be a European answer to the German question” (Brandt, cited in Weber & 
Kowert 2007, 85). This, he stressed, was as much in Germany‟s interests as 
European peace and good East-West relations, underlining the extent to 
which Germany‟s fate was bound up with Europe‟s ideological division 
(Schweiger 2007, 49). In practical terms, Brandt‟s policy of détente with the 
East also had to be pursued in close cooperation with European allies, under 
the terms agreed in the 1955 Deutschlandvertrag.    
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On becoming chancellor in 1982, Helmut Kohl would explicitly adopt 
the internationalist approach to German unification, arguing that “we all want 
to transcend the division of Europe and, within it, the division of our 
fatherland” (cited in Weber & Kowert 2007, 95; Wood 1998, 320). His decision 
to host GDR leader Erich Honecker on a „working visit‟ to the FRG in 1987, 
and his key role in moving quickly towards unification, also have similarities 
with Brandt‟s pragmatic approach to German-German relations. For one, they 
were based on an assertion of ongoing German national unity  (Zückert & 
Zückert 1993, 140). This contrasts with the SPD‟s much more cautious 
attitude to unification which, though it proved to be well-founded, did not 
chime with the mood of the time. Oskar Lafontaine, the SPD chancellor 
candidate in the 1990 federal elections, called for a new constitution giving 
due weight to East German wishes and the slow development of a fresh 
institutional set-up. Indeed, his overall political outlook was so internationalist 
that in 1989 he called for a United States of Europe (already mooted by 
Winston Churchill in 1946) and looked forward to a time which “will make 
national state concepts out of date” (Lafontaine, cited in Weber & Kowert 
2007, 104). Lafontaine‟s distaste for nationalism extended to all its 
manifestations. He sought to supersede the nation-state completely in the 
spirit of the 1968 generation, and perhaps also realise the transnational 
flavour of his regional Heimat, the federal state of Saarland on the French 
border.  Even though they saw unification differently, both Kohl and 
Lafontaine were therefore committed to embedding Germany further in an 
international framework. Kohl would demonstrate this in his support for the 
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1992 Treaty on European Union (also known as the Treaty of Maastricht), 
with its goals of economic and monetary union and a common foreign and 
security policy. 
  
The EU was long regarded positively in post-war West Germany as an 
alternative project to the difficult process of nation-building. This “often led to 
an almost artificial denial of national sentiments and an exaggeration of 
European idealism” (Schweiger 2007, 46). Successive West German leaders 
seemed to equate the country‟s interests with those of the EU, perpetuating 
the close link between German and European identity in their nation-building 
ideology. European integration became more problematic in the 1990s, 
however, as Germany was faced with the social and economic consequences 
of unification. The so-called „normalisation‟ of united Germany‟s international 
status also threw the strategic nature of its pro-integrationist stance into stark 
relief. For some conservative journalists, politicians and historians, unification 
signalled the end of the post-war era and an invitation to reassess Germany‟s 
role in Europe. A more critical approach towards European allies was 
articulated in the widely read, conservative broadsheet Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) and news magazines like the weekly Spiegel, in particular by its 
editor Rudolf Augstein. He used its pages explicitly to demand full German 
sovereignty and, in no uncertain terms, that “all four of the victorious Allied 
powers (Siegermächte) should get out of Berlin” (Augstein, cited in Wiegel 
2001, 155).iii This also influenced the argument that German nation-building 
was no longer beholden to European integration as it once was. Other media 
commentators such as Günter Wetzel, writing in the FAZ, were of the view 
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that state sovereignty should henceforth trump the long-standing policy of 
Westbindung, one which according to him had always undermined the Basic 
Law‟s commitment to unification (Wiegel 2001, 157). This view ran counter to 
a vision of the nation-state as embedded within - rather than antagonistic 
towards - regional structures. Yet the embedded approach continued to be 
favoured by both Chancellor Kohl‟s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
and his Green party successor in 1998, Joschka Fischer, who was explicit in 
calling for a federal Europe to transcend the nation-state. Kohl himself, though 
he was to be remembered as the „chancellor of unity‟, was at pains to 
reassure his EU partners that reunification should take place within a strong 
European framework. During the 1990s, the official national narrative of 
pacifism, openness to asylum-seekers and a commitment to Europe as 
enshrined in the German Basic Law was nonetheless being revised. The 
relationship between regionalism and nationalism had to be thrashed out 
anew. 
 
Whilst seeking to preserve and expand the EU framework, Kohl was 
also keen to promote a new sense of national identity during his 
chancellorship, which coincided with a reassessment of Germany‟s Nazi past. 
The conservative historian Ernst Nolte led the fray in the so-called 
Historikerstreit of the 1980s. His highly controversial, revisionist reading of 
Hitler and the Holocaust sought to question the apportioning of collective guilt 
on Germans and to relativise the horrors of Nazism in the context of Stalinism. 
Berlin, the carved up centre of the continued Allied presence since World War 
II, and the semiotics of its monuments also played a part in the debate. In 
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Nolte‟s view, a project such as the planned holocaust memorial in Berlin 
embodied everything that was wrong with a „totalising‟, anti-German 
discourse. Instead, Nolte argued that it should be dedicated to all the victims 
of what he called twentieth-century „ideological states‟ (Ideologiestaaten) 
(Wiegel 2001, 389), a clear reference to the Soviet Union. Kohl himself waded 
in with his proposal for a German Historical Museum, a plan which was 
formally adopted to coincide with Berlin‟s 750th anniversary in 1987. Together 
with the reassessment of Nazism, this was an important element in what has 
been defined as a neo-conservative process of „renationalisation‟ beginning in 
the 1980s, aiming for “the homogenisation of the German people, which could 
then present itself as a closed unit in international competition”iv (Wiegel 2001, 
13). Understood as a cultural discourse encompassing both historiography 
and the shift to a Christian Democrat majority government in 1982, 
„renationalisation‟ sought to challenge more left-wing interpretations of 
German identity which had flourished since the 1960s.  
 
Like Adenauer, who had pursued a canny policy of reassuring his 
European allies whilst establishing limited German sovereignty and achieving 
NATO membership by 1955, Kohl regarded regionalism as an asset to nation-
building. Yet the prospect of German reunification in 1990 rekindled fears, 
notably in France and the United Kingdom, that an enlarged and economically 
powerful Germany might pose a future threat. These fears proved to be 
largely unfounded, as the East German „blooming landscapes‟ promised by 
Kohl failed to materialise, and the economy struggled with the crippling cost of 
reunification. By signing up for Economic and Monetary Union at Maastricht in 
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1992, Germany gave up the Deutschmark – “almost a national monument” in 
itself (Fulbrook 2001, 228) - in return for promises of closer political 
integration. Once again, Germany regarded this as furthering its 
constitutionally entrenched aim to be “an equal member of a united Europe,” 
but also as a politically expedient means of shifting responsibility for 
controversial asylum and immigration regulations to the European level. With 
the Deutschmark, however, went a strong, tangible symbol of West German 
values, one which Jürgen Habermas‟ advocacy of rather abstract 
constitutional patriotism could not replace (Habermas 1996, 133). Little heed 
was paid to the fact that former citizens of the GDR were having to handle 
their third currency in twelve years.  
 
The SED had been shadow-boxing with the FRG throughout the GDR‟s 
existence. Politically, a cornerstone of official GDR nation-building attributed 
all Nazi perpetrators and guilt to West Germany. Economically, the SED had 
vowed to catch-up with and overtake the FRG. Culturally, the SED claimed to 
be the true guardian of Goethe, Schiller and others‟ legacies, backing this with 
investment in museum collections such as the Museum für deutsche 
Geschichte in Berlin. From the 1960s onwards, however, it moved to replace 
the adjective „German‟ in official discourse with „GDR‟, in an attempt to 
establish its particularity and repudiate any West German links. Ironically, this 
GDR identity remained largely semantic until the dying days of the regime, 
when it provided a focus for reform-minded citizens, and retrospectively for 
those aspects of GDR life not associated with the authorities. Although the 
SED‟s nation-building ideology failed to achieve its legitimising end, this 
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makes its construction no less intriguing. Indeed, SED ideologues performed 
interpretational acrobatics in order to dissociate historical figures from 
unacceptable associations and turn them into „socialist national‟ heroes of an 
East German stamp. Some historical interpretations in unified Germany could 
be criticised as no less subtle.  
 
Many of the discussions surrounding the perceived lack of „inner unity‟ 
in Germany today do not examine the presumption of nationhood on which 
they are based. Paradoxically, one commentator claimed in 1963 that the 
experience of being torn apart was actually constitutive of German identity 
(Enzensberger, cited in Brunssen 2002, 23). Today, others argue that whilst 
both East and West Germany sought to define themselves in opposition to the 
Third Reich (and each other), post-unification Germany tends to measure 
itself against West Germany‟s positively portrayed Erfolgsgeschichte, or 
success story (Brunssen 2002, 19). This, in turn, is reflected in its negative 
depiction of the GDR, which includes drawing parallels between SED 
authoritarianism and Nazism, the GDR‟s problematic characterisation as an 
Unrechtsstaat, and intense scrutiny of the secret police and the Berlin Wall 
over other aspects of East German history. One prominent proponent of this 
discourse was the Enquete Commission, a body composed of German federal 
parliamentarians. Conceived as an alternative to the truth and reconciliation 
commissions created in post-apartheid South Africa, post-Pinochet Chile and 
elsewhere, it was tasked with investigating the legacy of the GDR for the 
Berlin republic. Avowedly political, its conclusions clearly supported an “anti-
totalitarian consensus” in comparing the authoritarianism of the Third Reich to 
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the GDR (Cooke 2005, 38). The idea of German unity was also upheld in the 
portrayal of the GDR as an illegitimate “aberration of history” (Cooke 2005, 
40) as opposed to a constitutive part of contemporary Germany‟s heritage. 
The overriding emphasis on the iniquities of the GDR system served to cast 
the FRG, and the West German politicians turned historians on the 
commission, in a better light. As such, this eminently politicised reckoning with 
the past did not extend to any possible shortcomings within the FRG 
(Fulbrook 1994, endnote 3). Rather ironically given its own partisan approach, 
the commission‟s 1994 report urged readers not to forget “the horrors of the 
fallen dictatorship […] in the face of an undifferentiated „GDR nostalgia‟” (cited 
in McAdams 2001, 111). It thereby reinforced a nation-building project 
premised on the greater validity of the West German experience and 
continuity between the Bonn and Berlin republics. Its interpretation of history 
left little scope for examining the complex legacy of life in the GDR and 
“probably did more to impede inter-German understanding than to further it” 
(McAdams 2001, 20). An alternative report “from left-wing standpoints” 
(Allinson 2001, 50) sought to emphasise lived experience in the GDR over its 
ideology and institutions, but the two main reports‟ harsh condemnation of all 
things East German remain more indicative of the dominant discourse. 
 
Vietnamese and German history briefly collided due to the worldwide 
repercussions of the Vietnam-American war. Fuelled by the media impact of 
events such as the 1968 Tet offensive, emerging evidence of the My Lai 
massacre and a constant stream of searing photojournalism, the DRV was 
widely seen internationally as the victim of U.S. aggression. In Germany too, it 
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was used as a role model for resistance. Rudi Dutschke, leader of the 
German student movement, drew parallels between the anti-authoritarianism 
of his cause and Vietnamese communist struggle. On the other hand, 
opposing, pro-US factions equated the defence of the RVN with that of West 
Berlin in a Cold War comparison writ large (Davies 2007). Germany was also 
beginning its own “debates over Germans as either perpetrators or victims” of 
Nazism (Green et al 2008, 19). This would continue into the 1990s with the 
publication in 1997 of Daniel Goldhagen‟s book entitled „Hitler‟s willing 
Executioners‟ and the Wehrmachtausstellung, an exhibition exploring the 
extent to which ordinary soldiers had been implicated in Nazi atrocities. The 
debate hinged on whether the German people should be portrayed as the 
victims of war, terror and devastation wrought by a relatively small, murderous 
elite, or carry some of the blame themselves. The GDR‟s anti-fascist myth, on 
the other hand, had clearly exonerated its citizens from any responsibility, 
whilst pointing to West Germany‟s aborted denazification as evidence of 
continuity with the fascist regime. The absorption of many former Nazis into its 
own socialist system was simply passed over in favour of this clear ideological 
line, as was any meaningful coming to terms with the past. Meanwhile, 
historical continuity between the GDR and Germany‟s pre-Nazi past was 
manufactured through a workers‟ narrative and official reverence towards 
cultural icons. Its celebrations of these figures paralleled the VCP‟s 
commemoration of selected Vietnamese heroes and role models (Pelley 
2002, 173), a widespread practice across the communist world.  
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West Germany‟s freedom of expression naturally gave rise to greater 
ambiguity regarding victims, perpetrators and the related question of historical 
continuity. Did the Third Reich represent an unbridgeable caesura, or was 
Germany‟s post-war status an „unnatural‟ division hindering a return to 
Germany‟s rightful historical path, as the term reunification suggested? These 
interpretations, highly politicised and polarised as they were, presuppose a 
shared yearning for a single narrative thread uniting Germany across both 
space and time, regardless of whether the chosen starting point is taken as 
Bismarck‟s political creation of 1871 or a prior, ethno-symbolist Kulturnation.  
They also all recognised one victim of the Nazi period, namely German 
national identity, though views differed widely on whether it should be 
rehabilitated (Schwilk and Schacht 1994) or forever laid to rest in favour of an 
internationalist outlook. In policy terms, the Bonn republic‟s foreign policy “was 
shaped by a binary objective of recreating a united Germany in a united 
Europe” (Wood 1998, 320), yet the nature of the nation justifying this goal 
remained open to question, not least due to the issue of immigration. German 
unification in 1990 put West German politics and economics from 
Westbindung to the Wirtschaftswunder in wider historical perspective, with a 
significant strand of neo-conservative opinion arguing for a return to „national 
normality‟ unhindered by war guilt. The shift in focus to “the image of a nation 
legitimated through tradition and history [experienced] Germany‟s fascist past 
as a block on that unbroken, positive relationship to history” (Wiegel 2001, 
178).v All these strands of opinion revolved around the question of how to 
define a united German nation.  
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Conclusion 
Germany and Vietnam share a presumption of national unity despite decades 
of division. In contrast to Germany, however, positively connoted national 
patriotism has been identified as one of the most important features of the 
Vietnamese mental world (Pham et al 2001, 14). The Vietnamese 
experienced the clash with French colonial culture as an awakening. This led 
to various forms of nationalist resistance, with the VCP eventually emerging 
victorious. However, one particular difficulty encountered by the VCP has 
been to integrate the Vietnamese south into a nation-building narrative. The 
southern “history of intense engagement with the capitalist world [has resulted 
in] attempts by the central government to eliminate and, failing that, assimilate 
these legacies, while trying to retain power in an era of globalised capitalism” 
(P. Taylor 2001, 193).  It is dangerous to assume that political developments 
in Asia will necessarily lead to Western-style liberal democracy 
(Gainsborough 2002, 696). The 2006 coup in Thailand, until recently 
considered a standard bearer of South-East Asian democracy, is a case in 
point. The 1990s rhetoric of prominent leaders such as Singapore‟s Lee Kuan 
Yew and Malaysia‟s Mahathir Mohamad is another (Mahathir & Ishihara 1995; 
Sutherland 2006b). Neither can social scientists measure popular legitimacy 
in South-East Asia through the blunt instrument of the ballot box, and more 
sophisticated methods are being developed and tested (White 2005). Yet 
official nation-building in Vietnam is nevertheless based on the pursuit of 
popular legitimacy and state sovereignty. The latter might seem increasingly 
untenable in the context of globalisation, but the concept of sovereignty is still 
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useful in linking nation-state legitimacy with the wider regional context to 
which it must adapt. Recent studies of the Vietnamese state highlight great 
variations in its degree of penetration and control over different areas of the 
political system (Dixon 2004, 16). The present political climate is also a 
mixture of tolerance and periodic clampdowns. The case of Vietnamese 
nation-building in ASEAN has shown that regionalism can be reconciled with 
a nation-building project, similar to Germany within the EU. In Vietnam, this 
has been achieved by subordinating regionalism to an existing political 
ideology. In united Germany, despite „normalisation‟ and a return to full 
sovereignty, by extending West Germany‟s commitment to European 
integration into the twenty-first century. Regionalism can thus be used to 
bolster both national legitimacy and external sovereignty; “ASEAN is 
[designed] to support Southeast Asian nation-building” (Palmujoki 2001, 14). 
Likewise, the EU framework reassures Germany‟s partners and its own 
governments that nation-building can take place without slipping into 
chauvinistic nationalism. It remains to be seen how nation-building actually 
takes place through a range of empirical examples considered in the following 
chapters. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i„Ich kam von Deutschland nach Deutschland, war der Sprache mächtig - und 
verstand kein Wort. Warum? Weil das kulturelle und politische 
Koordinatensystem der Gesellschaft, in die ich nun geraten war, so anders 
war, als jenes, das ich kannte. Ich kam mir vor wie in einem fremden Land.“ 
ii „Einerseits müssen die beiden Teile Deutschlands nach der Vereinigung 
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zusammenwachsen. Und diese Eingliederung geschieht im Namen der 
ethnischen Zusammengehörigkeit. Auf der anderen Seite kann die Integration 
der Einwanderer jedoch nicht im Namen einer ethnischen Nation vollzogen 
werden.“ 
iii „[...] darum sollen alle vier Siegermächte aus Berlin verschwinden.“ 
iv „[...] die Homogenisierung der deutschen Bevölkerung […] die sich so als 
geschlossene einheit im internationalen Konkurrenzkampf präsentieren soll”  
v „[...] die Vorstellung der durch Tradition und Geschichte legitimierten Nation 
[…] Die faschistische deutsche Vergangenheit als Blockade jedes 
ungebrochen positiven Bezugs auf die Geschichte ist demnach für beide 
Richtungen des Neokonservatismus ein gravierendes Problem, dem  mittels 
Relativierung, Historisierung und offener Umwertung begegnet wird.” 
